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                                                                  Abstract  
There is widespread debate on what constitutes civil society and its importance in development 
and poverty reduction. The debate has been on-going since the term was coined by Aristotle 
during antiquity. The concept of civil society has derived much of its significance from Western 
political and philosophical thought; however traces of the concept can also be found in African 
notions of community and personhood as popularized by the concept of ubuntu. Scholars have 
struggled to put forward a substantive theory of civil society because it has different meanings 
for different people, places and historical times. The concept’s importance was relegated to the 
periphery of political and developmental discourse due to the rise of the welfare state in the 
1950s and economics in the 1970s. However, civil society’s success, particularly in Poland and 
(former) Czechoslovakia,in the struggles against despotism in the Eastern bloc during the 1980s 
cemented its reputation as a form of ‘third way’ which can compensate for the failures of the 
state and the market. In the 1990s civil society became the ‘favoured child’ for driving 
development in third world countries. However since then national and international funding 
for civil society organizations has not tallied with the results on the ground, thereby prompting 
scholars to doubt its importance in developmental discourse, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This study argues that NGOs, which are a subset of civil society, are still important in the 
development of third world countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa. The study’s main line of 
argument is elaborated by an exploration of how two prominent NGOs, Commercial Farmers 
Union (CFU) and Justice for Agriculture (JAG), have been involved in land policy in Zimbabwe 
between 2000 and 2015. During this period, the Zimbabwean government adopted and 
implemented a chaotic and violent land redistribution programme, thereby creating mayhem in 
the country’s socio- political and economic status-quo. It is in scenarios like these that NGOs 
become important in safeguarding the interests of the less privileged and supplementing 
government’s failures using different strategies. However these strategies create problems, for 
NGOs working in sub-Saharan Africa. It is because of these problems that resources channeled 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
The importance of civil society is contested (Edwards, 2009), especially in developing countries 
with repressive and restrictive regimes who endeavor to dismiss or label it as a proxy of 
Western hegemony and neo-colonialism (Makumbe, 1998).The task of this study is to look at 
the importance of civil society in the contextual setting of two NGOs which have been involved 
in Zimbabwe’s land policy since year 2000, namely, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and 
Justice for Agriculture (JAG). NGOs belong to the broader spectrum of associations called ‘civil 
society,’ a form of a ‘third way’ between state and market, which a majority of policy 
practitioners believe is now essential for development and poverty reduction (Putman, 2000; 
Edwards & Hulme, 2002; Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002; Edwards, 2009). However the voice of 
skeptics who question the importance of civil society in developmental discourse are becoming 
louder (Rugendyke, 2007). Contrary to skeptics’ views, this study argues that just like the state 
and business, civil society is essential for development (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). The 
majority of scholars believe that civil society organizations, particularly those oriented towards 
protecting vulnerable groups, are the strong social institutions needed to provide checks and 
balances against over indulgence of the state and business at the expense of the disadvantaged 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) argue that the failure of the ‘first 
generation’ of policy analysts was an over emphasis on economics at the expense of social 
institutions, of which civil society organizations are part. However the big debate is now on how 
this can be achieved. This study argues that a pivotal role for civil society best can be achieved 
through the involvement of NGOs in influencing public policies. Moyo (1999) notes that "the 
Zimbabwean land reform policy case offers an interesting basis for examining the workings of 
democratization process in Africa especially in terms of the institutional framework within 
which the land policy has evolved" (p12). In line with Moyo’s (1999) analysis, the study will 






1.2 Background of Land Policy in Zimbabwe 
Land has always been a contested issue in the socio-political and economic landscape of the 
territory which became known as Zimbabwe. The arrival of whites in late 19th century 
worsened the situation. Once a white minority government had been established, it adopted 
laws which enabled whites to benefit from the fruits of land at the expense of the other racial 
groups. The result was that at independence, more than 85% of prime land was owned by less 
than 15% of the population (Pazvakavambwa, 2007). It was imperative at independence that 
there should be an equitable distribution of land if any meaningful development was to be 
realized. The majority government created after independence adopted the willing seller- 
willing buyer policy of land redistribution. This policy is believed to have been negotiated at the 
Lancaster House conference which negotiated an electoral handover of power to a black 
majority government in Zimbabwe (Phiri, 2011). However, the regime has since argued that the 
willing seller- willing buyer policy was laden with problems prompting its abandonment at the 
turn of the millennium (Phiri, 2011). Born out of the abandonment of the willing seller- willing 
buyer policy was the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme (FTLRP) which has been dubbed 
chaotic and the cause of the socio-political and economic problems the country is experiencing 
today (Dorman, 2001).                                                                                                                                                     
 
1.3 Rationale for Choosing Topic and Preliminary Literature Review 
This research has been motivated by scholarly debate about the baffling fact that whilst billions 
of dollars are channeled towards sub-Saharan NGOs from aid organizations and agencies, funds 
expended don’t tally with results on the ground (Edwards, 2009). Scholars are highlighting a 
mismatch between resources channeled towards sub-Saharan NGOs and the effectiveness of 
their work, especially in policy influence (Edwards, 2009). The term ‘civil society’ has a long 
history and "has evolved with time, meaning differently at different times" (Fine, 1997: 8). 
Philosophers from Aristotle through to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Hegel to Marx 
struggled to provide civil society with substantive theoretical bases (Edwards, 2009; Pietrzyk, 
2001). Whatever can be fleshed out as a meaningful theory of civil society in one geographical 
region and historical era may not apply to other parts of the world or in different historical 
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epochs. For instance the concept of civil society rooted in the African notion of ubuntu is 
somewhat different from the Western concept. The concept of civil society has been with us 
since time immemorial with the radical left differing with liberal democrats on the issue. On the 
revolutionary left, Karl Marx dismissed the concept altogether, labeling it as a way of masking 
violent social revolts (Edwards, 2009). However with the demise of the Eastern bloc, Marx's 
arguments against civil society lost credibility. However the debate didn't end there. In the 
West (dominated by liberal democratic thought), the debate is no longer about whether or not 
civil society exists, rather it now focuses on questions relating to civil society, what it does, and 
how it is relevant to the socio-political and economic development of a nation (Edwards, 2009). 
These questions have been answered in different ways and by different scholars, practitioners, 
economists, politicians and policy analysts (Putman, 2000; Edwards & Hulme, 2002; Brinkerhoff 
and Crosby, 2002; Edwards, 2009). The majority of answers centers on the role civil society play 
in the democratization and development of a country. This dissertation will apply the questions 
and answers to the Zimbabwean context by focusing on the involvement of NGOs (a part of civil 
society) in trying to influence the government’s land policy. The study argues that NGOs are 
important in counterbalancing the failures of the state and the market in formulating and 
implementing public policies. It should be noted however that although these organizations 
have been the ‘favoured child’ of funding agencies in the developing world over the past 
twenty-five years or so, they are not magic bullets which can be fired in any direction in order 
to find their targets (Edwards, M. & Hulme, D; 2002). Zimbabwean political scholars in the form 
of John Makumbe(1998), Lloyd Sachikonye (1995) Jonathan Moyo (1993) and Sam Moyo (1992, 
1999, 2005) all agree that civil society is important in fostering socio-political and economic 
development in the country. However they noted that unlike their counterparts in the North 
Northern hemisphere sub-Saharan Africa's NGOs in general and Zimbabwean NGOs in 
particular are surrounded by a plethora of problems which cripple their operations, resulting in 
minimum impact especially on policy decisions. These problems, according to Moyo (1999), 





1.4 Conceptual Framework upon which the Study is based 
The conceptual framework fully presented in Chapter Three sees civil society as "an aggregate 
of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities-
economic and cultural production, voluntary associations, and household life-and who in this 
way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon 
state institutions" (Makumbe, 1998: 305). Collectively NGOs, which are a subset of civil society, 
are not-for-profit organizations. The United Nations defines an NGO as "a not-for-profit group, 
principally independent from government, which is organized on a local, national or 
international level to address issues in support of the public good" (UN website). There are 
different types of NGOs. David C. Korten (1990) identified three: (1) generation one NGOs are 
involved in relief and welfare services, (2) generation two NGOs focuses on uplifting 
communities in self sustenance through small scale and self-reliant local development, and (3) 
generation three NGOs are concerned with the development of sustainable systems at local, 
national, regional or international level. The study looks at CFU and JAG at the level of third 
generation NGOs as both have been involved in land policy influence in the country. In trying to 
influence policy, NGOs have a number of strategies to use, among them are: (1) NGOs 
partnering government in policy formulation and implementation, (2) NGOs fostering 
accountability in the way a policy is implemented and, (3) NGOs advocating a total change of 
the policy or the way it is implemented. Within these strategies are tactics and resources at 
NGOs’ disposal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1.5 Research Problem and Questions 
1.5.1 Research Problem 
The beginning of the twenty-first century saw a massive, chaotic and heavily politicized land 
redistribution exercise in sharp contrast to the previous policy of willing seller-willing buyer 
entrenched in the Lancaster House agreement of 1980. A majority of commentators blame the 
chaotic FTLRP for the erosion of the ‘good society’ (which NGOs attempt to build) in the country 
(Dorman, 2001). Therefore the study will look into ways in which NGOs have been involved in 
efforts to influence land policy during this very trying period as a way of answering questions 
raised in this study. The paper looks at land policy influence from two dimensions. The first is 
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the actual policy as rooted in the country's constitution and secondly, the way the policy has 
been implemented. Land has always been a sensitive issue in the geo-political, social and 
economic landscape of the country dating back many centuries. This is because the country has 
an agro-based economy and thus, land is the backbone of development. Any form of unequal 
distribution of land divides the country in terms of development. In this case NGOs come in as 
watchdogs fostering accountability, fairness and equitable distribution and utilization of the 
scarce resource of land in order to spur development. They can also partner government at 
different levels in implementing land policy as NGOs in most cases have capacity: human 
resources well informed in policy issues and few in the way of bureaucratic hurdles compared 
to the government. 
1.5.2 Research Questions  
This paper will address the following questions: 
1. What role have NGOs played in policy influence in Zimbabwe? 
2. How NGOs can influence policy in Zimbabwe? 
3. What problems and challenges are faced by NGOs in trying to influence policy in Zimbabwe? 
4. How can NGOs in Zimbabwe deal with these problems and challenges? 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
1.6.1 Qualitative Research                                                                                                               
Doing research in Zimbabwe during the current political situation is not easy, more-so on a 
socio-political and economically sensitive issue like land. Over the years the issue of land has 
been laden with emotional and political maneuvers rendering it difficult to collect empirical 
data (Sibanda, 1994). This research limitation is exacerbated by the fact that the political 
situation in the country since 2000 has managed to instill fear in the minds of the general 
populace. The researcher thought that this could stand in the way in trying to collect primary 
data on such a sensitive issue, and instead chose to use qualitative research methodology in the 
form of content analysis. Qualitative research has the advantage of capturing the emotions 
involved, which are not easy to recognize using quantitative methodology. Content analysis 
involves secondary data analysis from the mass media, books, discussion papers, conferences, 
16 
 
academic journals and information from the NGOs' websites. Any information which could have 
been gathered through, for instance, interviews was easily found on the NGOs websites. The 
research used thematic analysis to identify, analyze and interpret the data. The data was 
collated according to two broad themes: (1) strategies involving liberal democratic notions of 
pluralism, and (2) strategies falling under radical formulations that are aimed at confronting 
oppressive social forces. The data was then sub-categorized into different strategies under 
those two broad themes, vis-à-vis problems associated with the strategy in Zimbabwe during 
the same period. 
 
1.6.2 Case Study 
The research was conducted in a form of a case study in which two prominent NGOs involved in 
the issue of land in Zimbabwe were studied. These are the CFU and JAG. These two NGOs were 
chosen because they represent two historical backgrounds and ideological orientations about 
NGOs in Zimbabwe. CFU has over 100 years of experience in serving commercial farmers in 
Zimbabwe and JAG was formed in 2002 at the height of the FTLRP. More so, both are unique in 
the sense that their work focuses on land and agriculture, which is the basis of this research. 
They notably represent Zimbabwean commercial farmers’ interests. When the government 
embarked on the FTLRP, CFU and JAG’s members were severely affected prompting the NGOs 
to be involved in land policy influence since then. The case studies were also chosen for the 
reason that they direct at “understanding the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy” (Huysamen, 1994: 
169) of how NGOs are involved in influencing public policies in Zimbabwe. The researcher is of 
the view that a thorough study of these two cases assists a clear perspective on the dynamics of 
the whole system, thereby enabling "understanding, extension of experience, and increase in 
conviction in what is already known" (Stake, 2006: 126) about NGOs in Zimbabwe. The cases 
chosen are for aiding our understanding and experience on how NGOs in Zimbabwe have been 






1.6.3 Challenges Associated with Qualitative Methodology 
Quantitative researchers and reviewers are critical of qualitative methods which struggle with 
issues of validity and reliability (Ambert, et al, 1995). Validity entails the ability of a study to 
obtain correct answers to the issue under study and reliability is the ability of research to obtain 
the same results elsewhere (Bogdan & Taylor, 1990). Moreover qualitative researchers are 
accused of failing to detach themselves from their prejudices and pre conceptions built before 
and during the research (Bogdan & Taylor, 1990). Nevertheless, qualitative research is unique in 
that it seeks “depth rather than breadth”, “discovery rather than verification.” It enables 
researchers “to learn about how and why people behave, think, and make meaning as they do, 
rather than focusing on what people do or believe on a large scale” (Ambert, et al, 1995: 880). 
Additionally, qualitative research is primarily concerned with refining “the process of theory 
emergence through a continual ‘double-fitting’ where researchers generate conceptual images 
of their settings, and then shape and reshape them according to their ongoing observations” 
(Ambert, et al, 1995: 881). This enhances the validity of qualitative research (Ambert, et al, 
1995).  In that regard, the whole issue of how NGOs in Zimbabwe are involved in development 
through policy influence and the problems they encountered would be mirrored by the two 
cases chosen for this study.  
 
1.7 Structure of Dissertation                                                                                                               
The research will be presented in six chapters which are as follows: 
1.Chapter One- Introduction and Background to the Study. 
2. Chapter Two- Literature review. 
3. Chapter Three- Conceptual Framework and Analysis 
4. Chapter Four- The Case Studies. 
5. Chapter Five- Problems encountered by Zimbabwean NGOs from 2000 to 2015 and Possible 
Solutions to these Problems. 






This chapter has outlined the background of the study, the rationale of choosing the topic, the 
objectives of the study, questions the study tries to answer as well as the research 
methodology used. At the centre of the study is the role played by NGOs who are part of civil 
society in development and the problems they encounters especially in the third world and sub-
Saharan Africa in particular. The chapter highlighted that this can be answered by looking at 
how two prominent NGOs in Zimbabwe have been involved in the land issue from year 2000 to 


















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a rich history of scholarly debate on what civil society is, its purpose, merits and 
demerits, however scholars have struggled to formulate a substantive theory for the concept. 
This is because the concept has different meanings in different societies, as well as alternative 
meanings in the same society at different times. The concept is heavily indebted to the neo-
liberal democratic thought of the West, although footprints can also be found in the African 
notion of ubuntu. Throughout its history, civil society has one objective: to emancipate the 
individual within a group (Edwards, 2009). This chapter will look at the historical development 
and purpose of civil society by unpacking the views of leading philosophers, political thinkers, 
scholars, academics and practitioners, as well as from the African perspective. How 
Zimbabwean NGOs have tried to influence public policies in the past and problems they 
encountered as highlighted by leading scholars will also be discussed.  
2.2 A Brief History of Civil Society in the West 
The concept of civil society is deeply imbedded in political and philosophical thought. Although 
the concept took shape around the 1980s as a result of disillusionment with both the state and 
the markets in the West (Howell and Pearce, 2001), the concept can be traced back to 
antiquity; the concept has metamorphosed during the medieval period and Enlightenment 
through to the present day (Pérez-Díaz. V, 2011). In antiquity, civil society was synonymous 
with the whole political society; however as time went by, especially during the enlightenment, 
philosophers and political theorists started separating it from the state and viewing it as an 
autonomous body independent of the state (Wiel, B.D, 1997). Greek thinker and philosopher 
Aristotle is widely viewed by many as the first to use the term civil society, although his 
meaning of the term is not the same as the current meaning. (Wiel,B.D, 1997; Pietrzyk, 2001). 
In antiquity, the state and civil society were seen as one and the same thing with the task of 
"governing social conflict through the imposition of rules that restricted citizens from harming 
one another" (Edwards, 2009: 6). In this view, the purpose of civil society was to maintain order 
in the Aristotelian polis through entrenching ‘civility’ in citizens (Edwards, 2009). This was 
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brought about by society as a natural community (Pietrzyk, 2001) through building upon the 
rational characteristics that are already part of existing experience (Seligman, 1992).This 
conceptualization of civil society and state as one and the same thing continued up to late 
medieval period. Thomas Hobbes' assessed the life of men in the state of nature as "solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short," (Hobbes, 1996: 14/64) and characterized by survival of the 
fittest. He therefore argued that individuals must surrender their civic virtues derived from 
natural law to a body (commonwealth) which, according to Hobbes,  will be able to administer 
peace and safeguard each individual's rights (Hobbes, 1996). This becomes the basis for a social 
contract between the governor (the state) and the governed (individuals). For Hobbes, this is 
the only way civil society can flourish. Hobbes’ failure to separate civil society from the state 
encouraged philosophers during the Enlightenment to present counter-arguments. 
 
Spurred on by the French and English Enlightenment (as a result of the horrific experiences of 
the English civil war and the French revolution) the concept started deviating from its conflation 
with the state. English philosopher, John Locke, used it interchangeably with political society 
(Locke, 1965). For Locke, unlike Hobbes, the state of nature through reasoning and arbitration 
of natural law is already social and political, guaranteeing freedom and equality to all men; 
however there is no guarantee for the respect and preservation of one's property (Locke, 
1965). Hence, "men were led to the state of nature and to set up society and political 
organization because they had to find a source of power for the regulation of property" (Locke, 
1965: 93). One such political organization is the state which is formed when men in the state of 
nature freely consent to surrendering their natural freedom and legitimate power to a 
government in order to safeguard and guarantee their own self-preservation (Locke, 1965). 
Because government is formed out of consent by men, men have the right to dissolve it when it 
shows signs of being tyrannical and preserving the rights of a few at the expense of the 
majority. However to minimize such a scenario, men who consented to surrendering their 
natural freedom to the state should exercise their power in civil society- a form of a political 
society- to curb and limit the powers of the state (Locke, 1965). In this view, Locke is credited 
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with propagating a clear distinction between the state, private property and civil society (Wiel, 
1997). 
 
The distinction between the state, business and civil society was made clearer by Hegel 
(although rooted in ethical rather than political life) (Elliot, 2003). Civil society was "an 
association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality, which, because of their 
self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal 
system, the means to security of person and property, and by an external organization for 
attaining their particular and common interests" (Hegel, 1942: 105). Hegel accepted the 
negative side of civil society, which, like a business organization, has the propensity for its 
members to treat each other only as mere means to their own individual ends, an idea firmly 
embraced by Marx. The state finds an important place in Hegel's views in as far as it limits the 
manipulation of civil society by unscrupulous individuals. Nevertheless, Hegel's theme 
reverberates with Alexis de Tocqueville, whom Edwards (2009) branded the most ardent civil 
society enthusiast of all. Tocqueville sees voluntary associations as essential in "curbing the 
power of centralizing institutions, protecting pluralism and nurturing constructive social norms" 
(Edwards, 2009: 7) He argued that civil society is important for inculcating democratic norms, 
guarding against state brutality and protecting weaker groups from complete domination by 
stronger and better resourced ones. The importance of civil society up until Tocqueville’s time 
was to protect the individual from tyrannical states. 
 
Civil society’s concept of safeguarding the interest of the majority was severely affected by 
Marx's arguments. Marx out- rightly dismissed the concept by branding it a vehicle for 
preserving individual interests by creating a bourgeois society (Marx, 1977). Far from its 
perceived benefits, civil society stifles man's total emancipation by masquerading as a walk to 
freedom when in actual fact it merely reduces an individual man to being a member of civil 
society (Marx, 1977). Thus Marx wrote, "the only bond that holds them together" in civil society 
"is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and egoistic 
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person" (Marx, 1977: 54). Hence man can find true emancipation if and only if he "recognize his 
own forces, organize them, and thus no longer separate social forces from himself in the form 
of political forces" (Marx, 1977: 54). This necessitates the withering away of all forms of 
association resulting in the rise of one class- the proletariat (Marx, 1977). Marx's arguments 
gave rise to two distinct views on civil society: those who were committed to its ideals and 
those who doubted its importance in human emancipation.  
 
Marx's arguments might seem appropriate if viewed from the angle of the uncivility of civil 
society, especially in this age of global terrorism and civil wars. For instance, can organizations 
like al Qaeda on the global stage, Interahamwe in mid-1990s Rwanda, Boko Haram in West 
Africa, drug cartels in Mexico and Columbia, the Lord's Resistance army in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa, al Shabab in East Africa and recently Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
be viewed as part of civil society? Furthermore, NGOs in the global South are constantly 
accused of corruption and unscrupulous conduct (Dorman, 2001), thereby supporting Marx's 
arguments against them. However, notwithstanding civil society's relative lack of theoretical 
grounding, we cannot throw away the whole basket of apples because two of them are rotten. 
It needed Marx's disciple Antonio Gramsci, to revive the concept of civil society in the post-
World War Two era (Mutz, 2006), although he deviated from his master's ideas. For Gramsci, 
civil society was "the cite of rebellion against the orthodox as well as the construction of 
cultural and ideological hegemony, expressed through families, schools, universities and the 
media as well as voluntary associations" (Edwards, 2009: 8). Civil society was important in as far 
as it shaped "the political dispositions of citizens"(Edwards, 2009: 8). 
 
In the mid-twentieth century and 1970s, the role attributed to the importance of civil society 
received mixed reviews from scholars. In the mid-twentieth’s century civil society was 
competing with the rise of the welfare state; in the 1970s it was competing with the provision 
of goods and services by business organization. It was synonymous with the struggles in Central 
and Eastern Europe against the claws of the Soviet Empire. According to Fine, it was thanks to 
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Civil Society’s association with democratic struggles that the concept gained its reputation 
(Fine, 1997). It distinguished itself as a sphere of social life in which oppressed people can 
express their liberty and challenge the oppressor in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s. 
The Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s in Europe and North America showed 
that business cannot be trusted to safeguard individual interests; despotism in the Eastern bloc 
showed that the state was also not up to the task. Hence a ‘third way’ was needed and civil 
society was the utmost answer as an agent of development and redistribution of resources 
symbolizing freedom and the defense of democracy (Howell and Pearce, 2001). Given the role 
played by civil society in the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989 the concept cemented its 
place, alongside the state and business, in developmental discourse. For that reason, Marx's 
arguments against the concept stood on shaky ground. 
 
Coming to the 1990s, with its reputation still intact as a result of its role in the struggles against 
Soviet despotism, civil society became the ‘favoured child’ of development across the globe 
(Edwards, M. & Hulme. D, 2002). Bretton Woods institutions quickly jumped on the 
bandwagon. On the development agenda, donor countries started citing good governance in 
the form of human rights issues, democracy and accountability as preconditions for aid (Moore, 
1993). Donor countries viewed civil society as a vehicle for promoting good governance (Howell 
and Pearce, 2001).  Scholars quickly pointed out that civil society was all along the missing link 
in fostering development in developing countries (Brinkerhoff D.W. & Crosby B.L, 2002). In 
order for a country to develop, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) point out that all the three agents 
of development (state, business and civil society) need to be strengthened in terms of capacity 
and interactions in order for them to fulfill their respective obligations. National development 
requires an interaction between a strong state and a strong society as both are important to 
development "because networks of intermediary associations act as a counterweight to vested 
interests, promote institutional accountability among states and markets, channel information 
to decision-makers on what is happening at the ‘sharp end’, and negotiate the social contracts 
between government and citizens that development requires" (Edwards, 2009: 13). Strong 
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policy analysis "emerges from the bottom up, not just from the top" (Brinkerhoff D.W. & Crosby 
B.L., 2002: 5). Civil society in this case acts as a vehicle for informing citizens of what their best 
interests are as civil society organizations are nearer to the grassroots, partnering government 
and business, and/or holding both accountable in policy formulation, adoption and 
implementation. This is how the Western concept of civil society found made an imprint in sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1990s. However, there are now some doubts pertaining to the importance 
of this concept as billions of dollars are being channeled towards sub-Saharan civil society but 
with no recognizable evidence of a difference being made on the ground (Edwards, 2009). 
2.3 History of Civil Society in sub-Saharan Africa 
If we say civil society's primary objective is to guide the interests of an individual in a group, 
then the concept also has traces in the African ethics of ubuntu. This is a rich notion which is 
part of life in the Nguni speaking people of Southern Africa. It portrays a human being as being 
human because of other human beings. This maxim is neatly captured by Desmond Tutu who 
postulates that, "a person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world 
fully formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings 
unless we learned it from other human beings. We need other human beings in order to be 
human" (Tutu, 2004: 25). In Nguni languages it is expressed as umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu 
which can loosely be translated as "a person is a person by association with other persons." 
This association in a way can be construed as a form of civil society in its loose sense for civil 
society provides "a reassuring oasis of solidarity and mutual support among like-minded people 
who provide each other with emotional as well as material support" (Edwards, 2009: 13). 
Ubuntu is a way of life which holds communities and societies together and in which vices are 
scorned and virtues praised, the very foundation on which the concept of civil society is build.  
 
Ubuntu can also be defined as an African worldview based on the values of intense humanness, 
caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values (Broodryk, 2002: 13). This worldview 
inculcates moral values in the form of "altruism, kindness, generosity, compassion, 
benevolence, courtesy, and respect and concern for others" (Letseka, 2000: 180). The family, 
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which can be regarded as part of civil society, is important in this regard. Gyekye notes that 
"one outstanding cultural value of the traditional African society that is a feature of ever-
present consciousness of ties of kinship is the emphasis on the importance of the family - the 
extended family" (Gyekye, 1997: 150). This extended family is a microcosm of the macrocosm 
including a broad spectrum of associations in form of children, parents, grandparents, uncles, 
aunts, cousins, nieces, and other distant relatives (Mbiti, 1975: 176). When these families are 
brought together they form villages, whose hierarchy of leadership consists of village heads, 
herd men and the chief.  
 
Quiet close to the family traditional ethos is communitarianism which is a form of 
interdependence found in African communities. A person is not left to face problems alone and 
this is evidenced even in greeting. In the African sense, greeting in the morning translates in 
English as "good morning, how are you?" and the reply is "I am fine, if you are also fine." This 
means "I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am" (Mbiti, 1989: 108). In this 
regard "whatever happens to the individual affects the whole group, and whatever happens to 
the whole group happens to the individual" (Mbiti, 1989: 109). So that these maxims are not 
mere words, Africans would come together to help and taking turns in ploughing each other's 
fields in preparation for planting, and also during weeding, and harvesting.  In times of disaster 
like sickness or death of a relative, neighbors would come and help in whatever way possible. 
It's actually taboo to have a private funeral in African societies because "communitarianism 
immediately sees the human person as an inherently (intrinsically) communal being, embedded 
in a context of social relationships and interdependence, and never an isolated, atomic 
individual" (Ramose, 1999: 320). This shows that one's duty to the community and society is 
more important than one's own personal aggrandizement. The "individual's image will depend 
rather crucially upon the extent to which his or her actions benefit others than himself" 
(Wiredu, 1997: 200). However, it should be noted that the individual does not lose her 
privileges and rights but rather they should be obtained as a community or society (Gyekye, 
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1987). This again sits well with the idea of civil society whereby emphasis is placed on the 
success of the wider society though not at the expense of the individual.  
 
Close to the communitarian way of life for Africans is their polity. They govern their affairs in 
such a way that they always seek consensus, whether at family, village, head man or 
chieftainship level in order to avoid antagonizing the other. Consensus means that decisions are 
taken in unanimity after rigorous consultations. This was clearly captured by Zambia's former 
president Kenneth Kaunda, "in our original societies we operated by consensus. An issue was 
talked out in solemn conclave until such time as agreement could be achieved" (quoted in 
Wiredu, 1995: 53). At the highest decision making body which is the chief's council, the 
councilors were drawn from all corners of the chiefdom, guaranteeing representation to 
everybody. The main aim of the council meeting was to grapple with interests from different 
sections of society and reach unanimity (Nwala, 1985). Nwala (1985) argues that "unanimity 
and all the rigorous processes and compromises ... that lead to it are all efforts made to contain 
the wishes of the majority as well as those of the minority. In short, they are designed to arrive 
at what may be abstractly called 'the general will of the people of the community’" (p168). This 
shows that African communities and societies were arranged in such a way that nobody will 
feel left out and that their interests were guided and taken into consideration when decisions 
were taken, which again is the ultimate purpose of people associating with civil society. Civil 
society "assumes that we will disagree, often profoundly, but calls on us to resolve our 
differences peacefully" (Edwards, 2009: 78) which, in a way, was the ultimate objective of the 
African polity. The African way of life shows that it was closer to Aristotle, Hobbes and to some 
extent Locke's views on the make-up, purpose and functions of civil society. Therefore it can be 
concluded that there are traces of the Western concept of civil society in African communities 
and societies since time immemorial. 
2.4 Civil Society during Colonialism 
This ubuntu setting was decimated by colonialism as a way of dismantling the solidarity and 
communalism among Africans as a tool of subjugation. Colonialism was marked by repression 
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and domination aimed at extracting rather than distributing resources (Biekart, 1999). 
European colonial masters used different ways of subjugating indigenous black Africans, one 
tool being the type of rule which was marked by centralized and decentralized despotism 
(Mamdani, 1996). Centralized despotism was typified by the use of European law in governance 
whereas decentralized despotism allowed the practice of customary law (Mamdani, 1996). Both 
types of governance turned blacks to either being fringe workers in urban areas or peasants in 
rural areas with no rights whatsoever. The conditions for colonized peoples were harsh enough 
to decimate their way of life. However out of such brutality emerged a form of civil society 
"that centered around mitigating the effects of harsh labor controls, challenging colonial rule, 
and preserving African traditions" (Wachira, 1998: 138). Associations became the rallying 
platform for disenfranchised black Africans. These associations took many forms like burial 
societies and community based organizations formed around traditional leaders (Makumbe, 
1998), up until the formation of black political parties which took it upon themselves to 
challenge the white rule sometimes through confrontation.  
 
The conclusion which can be drawn is that "just as the historical forces of capitalism and 
modernization shaped the emergence of civil society in Western Europe, so too the historical 
context of colonialism and anticolonial struggle molded states, societies, and civil societies in 
sub-Saharan Africa” (Biekart 1999: 180). This ahistorical tendency to impose a Western concept 
of civil society on Africans has been identified as one of the main causes of problems found in 
sub-Saharan civil societies today (Dorman, 2001; Moyo. S, 1999; Makumbe, 1998; Moyo. J, 
1993). There have always been forms of civil society discourse in Africa, however, with 
differences in conceptualization, composition and modes of operation to the Western 
discourse.  
2.5 Civil Society in Post-Independence Zimbabwe 
NGOs have proliferated in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980; however, this has not been a 
blessing in terms of NGO policy influence (Moyo, 1993). Shortly after independence, NGOs 
found themselves working more closely with government, as the newly installed majority 
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government tried to show the outside world and its citizens that it was democratic. However, 
this relationship with government came to haunt civil society as highlighted by Paul Themba 
Nyathi the former director of Zimbabwe Project: "at independence we laid down our advocacy 
... and we have paid a heavy price" (quoted in Rich, 1997: 17). Unfortunately for civil society 
organizations, this honeymoon didn't last long. The Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances of 
the early 1980s, which Mugabe himself referred to as ‘a moment of madness,’ raised their ugly 
heads. These disturbances, infamously referred to as "gukurahundi"- meaning cleaning away 
chaff- and in which an estimated 20 000 people, mostly of Ndebele origin, were killed, tends to 
define post-independence Zimbabwe. During the disturbances, government created no-go 
areas for civil society and media houses in the areas where these atrocities were being 
committed, with the only accounts of events coming from CCJP (Dorman, 2001). Any NGO 
working in these areas was seen as a threat and as a sympathizer to the dissidents the 
government was fighting against (Dorman, 2001). What caused these disturbances is not quite 
clear, but what is clear now is that the ZANU (PF) regime loves to hate different opinions, 
whether from other opposition political parties, the general populace or civil society (Tendi, 
2010; Freeth, 2012). This is evidenced by the way the government has treated opposition 
political parties and civil society organizations since independence (Freeth, 2012). (PF) ZAPU 
which provided pound-to-pound challenge to ZANU (PF) government in the early days of 
independence was vanquished violently, with its leader being referred to as a snake whose 
head must be crushed (Marondera, 2013). Government demonstrated the same attitude to 
Ndabaningi Sithole the leader of ZANU Ndonga and Edgar Tekere of ZUM, who were founding 
members of ZANU and comrades in arms with Mugabe. They faced numerous criticisms with 
the former being continuously dragged to the courts on unfounded treason charges (Tendi, 
2010). Morgan Tsvangirai, the current president of the main opposition (in terms of 
parliamentary representation) in Zimbabwe has not been spared either. He has been harassed, 
assaulted, arrested and jailed numerous times since his days as the Secretary General of ZCTU 
(Dorman, 2001). Government started consolidating its power, co-opting many NGOs or 
harassing those who resisted. This was done under the cover of creating a one-party state as a 




The final assault on civil society reached its climax with the enactment of draconian 
constitutional laws: Private Voluntary Organizations Act (PVO Act), Broadcasting Services Act, 
Public Order and Maintenance Act (POSA) and Access to Information Protection and Privacy Act 
(AIPPA). The PVO Act adopted in 1995 requires NGOs who want to operate in Zimbabwe to 
register with the Department of Social Welfare under the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and 
Social Welfare. The secretary of the organization needing to be registered under the Act should 
submit the organization's constitution, curriculum vitae of key board members, public notice in 
national papers, application and any other documents that may be needed by the Registrar of 
PVOs within the Ministry of Public Service, Labour & Social Services. Applications to the 
Registrar of PVOs can be lodged through the District and Provincial Labour & Social Services. If 
all documents are in order the Registrar will submit them to the PVO Board which will 
determine whether the application is rejected or accepted. The registration process can take 
three months to a year. This Act is worded in a way that enables arbitrary application, 
manipulation and abuse because it gives "the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social 
Welfare the mandate to register and de-register NGOs, and to suspend executive committee 
members if it appeared to the Minister on information supplied to him that: (a) the 
organization no longer operated according to the objective specified in its constitution; or (b) 
the organization was being poorly administered, jeopardizing its activities; or (c) the 
organization was involved in illegal activities; or (d) it was necessary or desirable to do so in the 
public interest" (Rich,1997: 17). It has been argued that in passing this Act, government had a 
sinister agenda because "NGOs are responsible to their membership and donors, who can 
remove unsatisfactory leadership or cease funding, and criminal penalties for mismanagement, 
fraud and other illegal activities also can be applied. Therefore, they questioned why NGOs 
need ‘special protection’ not required by private businesses or other professional 
organizations" (Rich,1997: 17). The PVO Act has resulted in numerous NGOs being denied 
registration, deregistered or its leaders being harassed and detained (Staff Reporter-New 
Zimbabwe, 2012). This has crippled NGO operations, especially in sensitive areas like policy 
analysis, because NGO leaders risk arrest from trumped-up charges if the government feels 
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threatened. For instance, at the height of the economic crisis of 2003 to 2008, civil society 
accounts were raided by the then Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor, Gideon Gono, for 
foreign currency (Banya, 2009). Gono’s action was enabled by the wording of the PVO Act. 
 
Faced by a struggle for its own survival, the ZANU (PF) led government also introduced a 
number of repressive laws, starting with the Broadcasting Services Act passed on 3 April 2001. 
The Act gives government sweeping powers over private broadcasters licensing with the 
Ministry of Information and Publicity. The Act gives government the sole power to appoint the 
Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) board which is tasked with issuing these licenses. 
Another example is AIPPA adopted in January 2002. AIPPA governs the operation and general 
conduct of the media in a way that leaves them with little breathing space and independence. It 
grants wide-ranging powers to a Media and Information Commission, again appointed by the 
Minister of Information and Publicity, and imposes licensing requirements on both media 
outlets and individual journalists (MISA-ZIMBABWE, 2004: 3). This Act leaves the media, which 
is an important component of civil society, to the mercy of government. It has also resulted in a 
high level of control by government over the flow of information and a corresponding shrinking 
of the space for freedom of expression for civil society and the citizenry as a whole. 
 
Like AIPPA, POSA was made into law in January 2002. Many legal experts believe it's a 
reincarnation of the colonial Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), introduced in 1960. 
LOMA was notoriously used by the colonial regime to lock up leaders of independence 
movements arbitrarily without charge. Mugabe himself was a victim of it in 1964 and was only 
to be released eleven years later in 1975. POSA restricts people's freedom of movement, 
gathering, association and demonstration by providing the police and security agencies with 
wide discretionary powers which they have notoriously used to crack down on civil society and 
opposition groups. Notorious features of the Act include: (1) The police may prohibit 
demonstrations in an area for up to three months if they believe this is necessary to prevent 
public disorder, (2) Public gatherings will not be allowed unless seven days' notice is given to 
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the police, (3) The police are allowed to take measures, including lethal measures, to suppress 
an unlawful public meeting (MISA-ZIMBABWE, 2004: 3). What is more worrisome is that 
security agencies have sworn allegiance to Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) regime (JAG and 
GAPWUZ, 2008), meaning whatever they do is to serve the continuation of the status quo even 
at the expense of the majority. These are the conditions under which Zimbabwean NGOs found 
themselves working at the turn of the millennium.  
 
According to a majority of leading Zimbabwean scholars (Makumbe, 1998; Sachikonye, 1995; 
Moyo. J, 1993; Moyo. S, 1992, 1999, 2005), civil society’s misfortunes cannot solely be placed at 
ZANU (PF) led government's door: they themselves played a substantial part in their woes. The 
majority of NGOs had a close relationship with liberation movements (ZANU PF and PF ZAPU) 
such that when independence was attained, the majority of these NGOs worked closely with 
government and according to Rich (1997), it was not surprising to see a government minister 
opening a conference or workshop for NGOs. While co-operating with the government is not 
problematic per se, however Edwards (2009: 27) warned, "any association that claims to 
promote the public interest is in dangerous water when it allies itself with a partisan political 
agenda, since it forfeits its claims to represent the broader agenda of civil society." When the 
government turned against its people during the Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances, 
NGOs which used to cooperate with the government like the CCJP and the ZCC found it difficult 
to report and condemn the purported atrocities committed in the affected areas by 
government forces. Any attempt to do so received a backlash from government (Rich, 1997), 
such that those social groups which tried to resist ZANU (PF)'s tactic of ‘exclusion by inclusion’ 
(Rich, 1997) under the guise of “'one state, one society, one nation, one leader', were branded 
as sell-outs bent on working for 'the enemy' as the ruling party publicly touted its commitment 
to a legislated one-party state, especially between 1980 and 1990" (Moyo. J, 1993: 7). This 
started an intriguing relationship between government and NGOs which shaped their 
interaction up to today. This relationship is littered with mistrust: government accuses NGOs of 
being tools of Western hegemony and neo-colonialism whereas NGOs feel the government is 
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always poking its nose where it is not needed. Dorman (2001) argues that it is the relationship 
which was created during the liberation struggle and the early years of independence which 
compromised Zimbabwean NGOs such that any attempt to break from that vicious cycle is met 
with the same resolve and vigor from government. The creation of draconian statutes to curb, 
limit and control NGOs' influence made the territory even murkier. However as suggested by 
Paul Themba Nyathi, too much blame is habitually laid at the government's doorstep. Themba 
Nyathi further points out that NGOs played a substantial part just after independence by laying 
down their advocacy work. This, perhaps, was because of the independence euphoria 
reverberating across the whole country. However, by the time they woke up from their 
advocacy slumber, the government had already built the strongest possible foundation for the 
confrontation. Given that the government always has control over state resources, it can flex its 
muscles as it pleases and that's the situation NGOs in Zimbabwe have been in since year 2000. 
 
Creating partnerships, networks and collaborations is one way of strengthening organizations' 
capacity in implementing policies (O'Toole and Montjoy, 1984; Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; 
Brinkehoff D & Brinkerhoff J, 2001;Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002;). Unfortunately, the NGO 
sector in Zimbabwe is seen as disorganized and fragmented (Rich, 1997). The chief culprit in this 
messy affair is NANGO, the umbrella body representing NGOs. NANGO is accused of lacking 
credibility from both the donors and its members such that it no longer functions in a 
meaningful way. NGOs blame NANGO for lack of consultation during the passage of the PVO 
Act. It is accused of not informing members or mobilizing them against the proceedings related 
to the Act. NANGO’s only intervention was to state their preference that the Act be referred to 
as the ‘NGO Act’ meaning it agreed with everything the Act stood for- which was in total 
opposition to its members (Rich, 1997). NANGO's reputation has been compromised by heavy 
infiltration by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) which works as the eyes and ears of 
the ZANU (PF) government (Rich, 1997), meaning there is no credible body coordinating NGOs 
activities. This lack of coordination on the part of Zimbabwean NGOs means there is lack of 
pooled resources and duplication of activities. It also means that lack of capacity in one NGO is 
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not compensated by other similar players. There is power in speaking with one voice, however 
this lack of coordination, networking and collaboration means each NGO speaks and acts for 
itself resulting in a lot of noise with no impact, especially in policy advocacy arena. 
 
A serious problem with sub-Saharan NGOs in general and Zimbabwean NGOs in particular is 
that "they are weak: organizationally, politically and resource wise" (Moyo, 1999: 10) and "they 
exhibit sharp racial and class divisions, with the high profile NGOs engaged in policy influence 
tending to be externally and to some extent white dominated (Moyo,1999). This stems from 
the fact that "civil society organizations in Africa too often are crippled by the same problems of 
poverty, corruption, nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, ethnicism, illiberalism, and 
willingness to be co-opted that plague the society in general" (Diamond, 1997: 24-25). The 
majority of Zimbabwean NGOs lack the necessary resources for their operations such that they 
always rely on donations from Western donor countries, agencies and even the government. 
Those donations usually come with stringent obligations which erode NGOs' autonomy such 
that instead of being accountable to their members, they become more concerned about 
accountability to their donor masters, and thus become mere implementers of their 
benefactors' agendas (Makumbe, 1998). For their part, donors fail to realize that "nation-states 
in much of the developing world are largely a colonial creation and the market economy has 
only a fragile hold, civil society in the South are bound to differ from those that emerged in the 
North" (Edwards, 2009: 3). 
 
Lack of resources in Zimbabwean civil society result in NGOs seeing other like-minded 
associations not as potential partners, but rather as competitors for the few donors available. 
This competition for resources also extends to government which feels that the resources 
poured to NGOs should be theirs (Dorman, 2001). This creates a hostile environment, forcing 
the majority of NGOs to "prefer doing business with the ZANU(PF) government behind closed 
doors, claiming that they are apolitical organizations and that it is better to co-operate with the 
government in private than to challenge it in public" (Moyo, 1993: 9). CFU has often been 
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accused of only representing the white commercial farmers’ cause (Moyo, 1999) and when the 
going got tough, it chose to work closely with the government. The problem with working with 
the ZANU (PF) government is that NGOs have to tow government's line, since any deviation 
prompts vicious retaliations (Moyo, 1993). Disgruntled members of the organization who felt 
betrayed went on to form JAG (Moyo, 2005) in order to take government head-on. This 
fragmentation weakens NGOs' cause rather than strengthening it.  
 
One major weakness among the majority of NGOs and other civil society organizations in 
Zimbabwe is that they lack democratic practices, structures and operations (Makumbe, 1998). 
The majority of Zimbabwean NGOs "are characterized by undemocratic behavior on the part of 
their leadership, lack of discussion of issues of concern and matters of operation, hierarchical 
organizational structures" (Darnolf, 1997: 20). Members lack the necessary information on 
issues relating to their organization's operations, resulting in loss of interest in its activities. 
NGO leaders have a tendency to withhold vital information as a way of masking the dark side of 
their operations. This entails that decisions are taken unilaterally, eroding the grassroots 
vibrancy which is vital for the strengthening, survival, and growth of NGOs.  Members are left 
with the feeling that it's important to pre-occupy themselves with daily bread and butter issues 
than fighting a losing cause. Unfortunately this feeling is reminiscent of society in general, with 
the majority of citizens participating in associational life only during election times and in most 
cases as a result of fear of victimization. Also of serious concern is that there is rampantly 
chaotic transfer of leadership among Zimbabwean NGOs (Makumbe, 1998). The majority of 
leaders constantly try to hang on to their positions even when odds are stacked against them. 
The most recent acrimonious fallout was witnessed in ZCTU between the Matombo-led 
executive versus the Nkiwane-led executive. Additionally, Lovemore Madhuku of the NCA has 
been accused of hanging on to power despite calls for him to give way for younger and fresher 





2.6 Non-Governmental Organizations and Policy Influence in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwean NGOs have struggled to influence the creation of a democratic space in pre- and 
post-independent Zimbabwe (Dorman, 2001; Makumbe, 1998; Moyo, 1995; Moyo, 1993). 
Governments both before and after independence have monopolized the policy making process 
in the country through ‘inclusion and exclusion’ of NGOs in the political landscape of the 
country (Dorman, 2001). The politics of inclusion include cooptation of NGOs in the political 
fabric of the ruling party and the policy making process (Dorman, 2001). The cooptation is 
usually done behind the mask of creating harmony in society. Furthermore, NGOs are included 
when piecemeal changes are being proposed: changes which make no significant impact on the 
political and policy making system as a whole (Dorman, 2001). Before 2000, a majority of NGOs 
were content with that (Moyo, 1999; Makumbe, 1998; Rich, 1997); however when the stakes 
were raised after the rejection of the February 2000 referendum ‘the honeymoon was over’ 
(Rich, 1997) and this heralded an era of exclusion of NGOs in policy processes (Dorman, 2001).  
 
Sibanda (1994) did intensive research on NGO public policy influence, albeit in areas which do 
not have much effect on the political landscape of the country. Moreover, this was at a time 
when the ZANU (PF) regime was fairly considered democratic (Dorman, 2001, Rich, 1997), when 
the government was still listening to different voices without much hullabaloo. Zimbabwe was 
regarded as peaceful and prosperous and the government wanted to try and show that it 
‘cared’ (Dorman, 2001; Rich, 1997). Hence NGOs could use numerous strategies and had 
resources at their disposal as this was the decade during which they were the ‘favoured child’ 
of development. Rich (1997) points out that even NGOs themselves were content with the 
prevailing situation. NGOs could interact with different ministries on a daily basis; both the 
political environment and government cooperation were positive (Tengende, 1994). NGOs 
regarded themselves as working hand-in-glove with government and even when NGOs tried to 
influence policy it was not taken as an opposition stance. As a result, they tried to avoid 
confrontational approaches to policy influence (Dorman, 2001; Rich, 1997; Tengende, 1994). 
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Most of NGOs’ policy influence happened behind closed doors and the socio-political and 
economic environment was favorable for such an approach. 
 
Everything changed with the coming together of many civic organizations to form the NCA 
which subsequently assisted in the formation of the opposition party, the MDC. The total 
fallout happened when the NCA, in coalition with the MDC and CFU, successfully campaigned 
for a ‘NO’ vote during the 2000 referendum. Government rhetoric towards NGOs changed. This 
was followed by a systematic onslaught on NGOs who didn’t tow government’s line (Tendi, 
2010; Selby, 2006; Dorman, 2001). Policy influence by NGOs become regarded as outright 
opposition especially on issues which could increase the democratic space in the country like 
constitutionalism, respect for human and property rights and a clear separation between 
government, business and civil society (Selby, 2006; Dorman, 2001). Suddenly, NGOs were 
confronted with an unfamiliar situation. The stakes were even higher with those NGOs working 
in areas which the government considered essential and non-negotiable like the land issue. The 
land policy and constitutionalism characterized the policy making process in post referendum 
Zimbabwe (Dorman, 2001). The reason the former has been chosen for this study and of 
paramount importance for this dissertation is the question of how NGOs tried to maneuver in 
their policy influence on such a sensitive subject during such a politically explosive period. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter unpacked the history and development of civil society from antiquity to the 
present day, giving the meaning and purpose of the concept during each historical period. The 
chapter has shown that civil society had different meanings in different historical epochs and to 
different peoples. The way civil society is understood in the Western political arena is different 
from the African perspective, with traditional Africans putting more emphasis on their notion of 
ubuntu which permeates the whole African way of life and in a way can be construed as part of 
civil society. Nevertheless, there is belief that these different perspectives have in a common, 
namely that the purpose of civil society is to emancipate the individual in a group. It has also 
been shown with reference to various leading scholars that Zimbabwean civil society faces huge 
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challenges which stem from both within the organizations themselves and from outside, with 
the ZANU (PF) led government being the chief trouble maker. Donor agencies also have a 





















CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction 
The concept of civil society is so broad such that the majority of scholars find it difficult to come 
up with a unified theory (Edwards, 2009). What is clear, however, is that civil society is separate 
from government and business, and this is the reason the concept is referred to as a ‘third way.’ 
Hence, its main objective is to supplement the failures of the government and business in 
developmental discourse. This chapter discusses various forms, streams and identities of civil 
society. The modus operandi of each stream is aimed at influencing public policies, inculcating 
norms which serve the interests of the majority and trying to achieve the common good. One 
stream which is part of civil society are NGOs which supplement government and business in 
humanitarian work, self-help sustainability of communities, as well as the focus of this study, 
namely,  public policy influence. NGOS can use a number of strategies and tactics to try and 
influence public policy. This chapter focuses on the land policy which has been a thorny issue in 
the geo-political, social and economic landscape of Zimbabwe since the arrival of whites in 
1890.  
3.2 Civil Society as the Associational Life, the Good Society and the Public Sphere 
The history of civil society presented in chapter two revealed how broad the concept of civil 
society is. Various associations outside of the state and the market can claim to be part of civil 
society (Fisher, 2007). Scholte (2002: 283) defines civil society simply as “a political space where 
voluntary associations deliberately seek to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect 
of social life.” By rules he means “specific policies, more general norms, and deeper social 
structures” (Scholte, 2002: 283), which are targeted by civil society through “formal directives 
(such as legislation), informal constructs (such as many gender roles), and/or the social order as 
a whole” (Scholte, 2002: 283). These voluntary associations include: academic institutions, 
business forums, clan and kinship circles, consumer advocates, development cooperation 
initiatives, environmental movements, ethnic lobbies, faith-based associations, human rights 
promoters, labor unions, local community groups, peace movements, philanthropic 
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foundations, professional bodies, relief organizations, think tanks, women's networks, youth 
associations, student associations and various not-for-profit organizations.  
 
In  Zimbabwe, Makumbe (borrowing from Sachikonye) sums up civil society as “an aggregate of 
institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities-
economic and cultural production, voluntary associations, and household life-and who in this 
way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon 
state institutions”(Makumbe, 1998: 305). Makumbe (1998), in relation to Africa, included trade 
unions, professional associations, churches and para-church organizations, resident’s 
associations, student bodies, business and other special interest associations which include the 
media, and various types of NGOs. This shows that the term is so broad that it can mean any 
associational life outside of the state and the market (Fisher, 2007). However, these 
organizations play a key role in pushing for new laws, programmes, policies or strategies; they 
hold government accountable by ensuring that national policy making does not forget the 
majority of citizens especially the vulnerable whose voices may not find willing ears. To put it 
simply, they ensure democracy, accountability and good governance. For that reason, civil 
society’s role in the twenty-first century is as important as the nation-state was in the twentieth 
century (Edwards, 2009). 
 
Civil society plays a key role in three areas which are interrelated: economic, political and social 
(Edwards, 2009: 13). In their economic role, civil society secures livelihoods and provides 
“services where states and markets are weak, and nurturing the social values, networks and 
institutions that underpin successful market economies including trust and cooperation” 
(Edwards, 2009: 13-14). Civil society supplements the failures of the state and markets in 
providing goods and services. The credit crunch which resulted in a massive global recession in 
2008 has shown that markets cannot be trusted to safeguard the interests of the poor majority. 
The poverty engulfing sub-Saharan Africa regardless of its vast minerals and human resources is 
also testimony that governments, if left to indulge their whims, only have appetite for 
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protecting the interests of a few. Civil society provides a way to ensure trust and cooperation 
between the state, the market and the citizens. It perform a social role by providing care, foster 
cultural life, intellectual innovation and teaches people “the skills of citizenship and nurturing a 
collection of positive social norms that foster stability” (Edwards, 2009: 14). In its social role civil 
society strengthens ‘social capital’, thus promoting collective action needed to achieve the 
common good (Edwards, 2009: 14). The common good is what societies endeavor for and it 
guarantees the preservation of the interests of the majority. On the political side civil society 
plays a crucial role in providing checks and balances to the power of states and business by 
promoting transparency, accountability, fairness, rule of law, and respect for human and 
property rights. Civil society promotes good governance by providing a voice to the voiceless, 
the weak and the downtrodden. This view is summed up by Edwards (2009: 15) who states that 
“a strong civil society can prevent the agglomeration of power that threatens autonomy and 
choice, provide checks against the abuse of state authority, and protect a democratic public 
sphere in which citizens can debate the ends and means of governance.”  
 
Civil society identifies and manifests itself as: (1) Associational Life, (2) the Good Society, and (3) 
the Public Sphere (Edwards, 2009). Civil society as a form of associational life is joined 
voluntarily and members are free to leave without forfeiting any of their rights and/or status in 
society. There are no criteria used to recruit members, and everything is done consensually. 
Human beings are motivated by their social nature (human beings are social animals) to 
participate in civil society (Edwards, 2009). The assumption is that life is worse-off without 
social interaction and “voluntary mechanisms are used to achieve objectives” (Edwards, 2009: 
20). There are no legal obligations or rewards binding members to participate. The voluntary 
nature of civil society is what makes it so exciting and appealing, as compared to the 
government and business. Government and business have obligations which need to be fulfilled 
by its members. Failure in government and business incur sanctions, whereas in civil society 





In civil society as the good society “all could be free to speak their minds and have their voices 
heard” (Edwards, 2009: 45). It is an arena in which everything done is to promote positive social 
norms and the relevant bonds essential for institutionalizing democracy, transparency, fairness, 
equality and good governance. This entails that public policies are made and implemented for 
the benefit of everyone especially the worse-off. Social capital which is strengthened by civil 
society enables success in solving public policy issues in a way that is just, fair, transparent and 
effective “as people of goodwill come to a fair and sensible consensus over matters of pressing 
concern” (Edwards, 2009: 48). When networks and norms of two or more people are connected 
they tend to have a strong impact on societal outcomes which depend on coordinated action 
(Blomkvist, 2003). Coordination of action is achieved easily because people in civil society 
voluntarily come together and therefore have a high chance of creating an atmosphere which is 
contains by higher levels of cooperation, equality, fairness and trust than exist in government 
and business where people are motivated to come together by incentives, rewards, prestige 
and status in society. Members of government and business discriminate against and compete 
with each other, sometimes violently, for personal benefits resulting in cooperation and trust 
being lost. Cooperation, equality, fairness and trust are important ingredients of social 
harmony; they enable citizens to pull together in one direction in their social, economic and 
political life. When citizens have a common goal, vision and purpose, they tend to uplift one 
another as peers and comrades in arms. This enables adoption and implementation of public 
policies which are meant to uplift the majority. Successes and failures in civil society are shared 
equally, and each person is an equally important component of the whole. 
 
Civil society as the public sphere inculcates tolerance for the other regardless of different 
political views, orientation, principles, philosophy, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
gender etcetera. This enables “effective governance, practical problem solving, and the 
peaceful resolution of our differences” (Edwards, 2009: 64). Civil society gives an opportunity 
for people to discuss issues which affect them on a daily basis in a free environment, with the 
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most rational arguments carrying the day.  It is civil society as the public sphere that “enable 
citizens to sort through their differences and achieve at least a functioning sense of the 
interests they hold in common so that they can be translated into norms, rules and policies that 
govern one or another aspect of social and economic life” (Edwards, 2009: 83). This encourages 
research and innovation which are key to development and poverty reduction. Success is 
hinged on “equality of voice and access, in particular, and a minimum of censorship so that the 
relevant information is available to all” (Edwards, 2009: 68). By involving everyone on an equal 
footing, solutions to societal problems are likely to be achieved effectively as this gives new 
answers to old questions and challenges what was supposedly considered orthodox (Edwards, 
2009). The aforementioned virtues of accountability, equality, fairness and transparency 
enables citizens to take government, business and their own organizations to task, enabling 
them to demand and participate in the adoption and implementation of public policies they 
believe will serve their best interests.  
 
Civil society as associational life is not uniform in its form, operations and objectives. Edwards 
(2009) identified three schools which enable civil society to make society as a whole strong and 
civil. The first school, he calls the ‘civic culture’, which “sees associational life in general as the 
driving force behind the consolidation of the positive social norms on which the good society is 
built” (Edwards, 2009: 90). It creates channels of communication which reinforce trust and 
cooperation. Civic values are cherished and vices scorned, conditioning citizens to pull in one 
direction in support of economic, social and political reforms which enables them to fight 
poverty and discrimination. The second school is the ‘comparative associational’ school, which 
“sees particular configurations of associational life as the key to securing the public policy 
reforms that the good society requires” (Edwards, 2009: 90). It enables channeling of 
information by pressuring government to be accountable in pursuit of the common good. If 
managed properly by bringing different groups on board, these comparative associations can 
have a huge influence in “policy advocacy and other forms of action in the public sphere that 
are simultaneously more effective, authentic and democratic” (Edwards, 2009: 90). The last 
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school is that of ‘skeptics’, which “disputes the links between forms and norms” (Edwards, 
2009: 85) followed by the first two schools. They favor “more complex interactions between 
different associational ecosystems and their context.”(Edwards, 2009: 85). This study draws on 
the second school which sees civil society as essential in pushing for the adoption and 
implementation of public policies which are deemed necessary for development. This 
perception is elaborated looking at how NGOs have been involved in the land policy issue in 
Zimbabwe since year 2000. 
3.3 Types of Non-Governmental Organizations 
NGOs are a subset of civil society which are “organized less formally through grassroots groups 
and membership associations of many different kinds” (Edwards, 2009: 30), which collectively 
are not-for-profit organizations. Definitions of NGOs vary depending on the context. NGOs are 
"mainly voluntary, or non- profit organizations that are found in the realm outside the state and 
private commercial sectors" (Dicklitch, 1998: 4). The World Bank defines NGOs' as “private 
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, 
protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development” 
(Malena, 1995: 13). In this context, NGOs are high-profile actors in the field of international 
development, both as providers of services to vulnerable individuals and communities and as 
campaigning policy advocates (Malena, 1995). According to the United Nations (UN) an NGO is 
“a not-for-profit group, principally independent from government, which is organized on a 
local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public good” (UN 
website). Furthermore, NGOs are task-oriented and made up of people with a common 
interest, performing a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bringing public concerns 
to governments, monitoring policy and programme implementation, and encouraging 
participation of civil society stakeholders at the community level (UN website). The 
Zimbabwean PVO Act views an NGO as an organization that is not profit oriented. Common 
features from these definitions are: NGOs are outside the sphere of influence of both the 
government and business, they are not-for-profit, and they are involved in both humanitarian 




There are different types of NGOs. David C. Korten (1990) identified three: generation one 
NGOs involved in relief and welfare services which respond to an immediate and visible need. 
For example, when an NGO provides humanitarian assistance in emergency cases like wars and 
natural disasters. The objective is to immediately alleviate the suffering population such that 
they will be able to live another day and somehow get on their feet and start over. In third 
world countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa these relief initiatives are necessitated by 
many government’s lack of resources. Most sub-Saharan countries are poor financially to the 
extent that governments face a huge challenge in providing public goods and services. 
Generation one NGOs chip in by providing transport which is able to reach the remotest parts 
of the region and by providing manpower and financial resources. They are also famous for 
providing water, sanitation and electricity in remote rural areas. Such NGOs are able to do that 
because they can source funds from rich donor nations and agencies. However, with specific 
reference to Zimbabwe, since 2002 the government owing to human rights abuses, has been 
under smart sanctions, restricting it from sourcing funds from international NGOs, 
headquartered in the West. In Zimbabwe, such NGOs include churches and organizations like 
World Vision, Care International, and Save the Children. Although such international emergency 
aid is worthwhile, they don’t offer a permanent solution to the causes of underdevelopment. 
They deal with symptoms rather than the underlying causes of such dire situations.   
 
Generation two NGOs focus on uplifting communities in self sustenance through small scale 
and self-reliant local development (Korten, 1990). They empower people at local levels through 
skills development and education such that even when the NGO ceases operations, people will 
be empowered through community self-help projects which sustain them in the long run. 
Second generation NGOs contribute to people-empowerment by encouraging co-operatives 
and local based community councils with the aim of coordinating operations. The objective is to 
help communities realize their full potential “through education, organization, consciousness 
raising, small loans and the introduction of simple new technologies” (Korten, 1990: 119). In 
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most cases, second generation NGOs give priority to villages or vulnerable groups within these 
villages like women, children, the disabled or the poor. They form partnerships with local 
people, and are responsible for providing financial resources and logistics as well as mobilizing 
and organizing the community to come together. Villages or vulnerable groups are responsible 
for decision making and implementation of the programme (Korten, 1990). Examples of such 
NGOs include Zimbabwe Women Finance Trust (ZWFT) which provides credit and savings 
mobilization facilities to poor and marginalized women, and Musasa Project which empowers 
women to combat and deal with domestic violence, Jairos Jiri and Danhiko which impart self 
help skills to the disabled. The most prominent NGO involved in sustenance endeavors is the 
CAMPFIRE which enables local people to harness resources in their areas for their benefit. 
Profits from the programme are used for community development or can be distributed to 
individual households at the discretion of the community. 
 
Generation three NGOs “look beyond the individual community and seek changes in specific 
policies and institutions at local, national and global level” (Korten, 1990: 120). They seek 
permanent solutions to the development agenda by focusing on creating sustainable systems at 
local, national, regional or international level. Generation three NGOs evolved from the 
realization that generation two strategies are unsustainable especially when the NGO ceases 
operations or they often when they are not supported by a national agenda and framework 
aimed at fostering development and accountability (Korten, 1990). Third generation NGOs aim 
to create changes through capacity building and building alliances by empowering citizens to 
make demands and inculcate a situation where the system becomes more responsive to 
people’s demands, needs, wants and interests. This sees third generation NGOs working with 
major national and international agencies with the aim of influencing national policies and 
empowering citizens to control their resources. This study looks at CFU and JAG at the level of 





3.4 Strategies and Tactics used by Non-Governmental Organizations to Influence Policy. 
In trying to influence policy, NGOs have a number of strategies to use, including: (1) partnering 
with government in policy formulation and implementation, (2) fostering accountability in the 
way a policy is implemented and, (3) advocating for a total change of the policy or the way it is 
implemented.  
3.4.1 Partnering with Government 
NGOs can help government in formulating and implementing policies. Most sub-Saharan 
governments lack the necessary resources and skills in policy analysis and are generally 
handicapped by bureaucratic hurdles which often stall policies’ progress. NGOs have a pool of 
human capital from their membership which is drawn from all walks of life; hence they have the 
capacity for policy analysis. In policy formulation they can advise government through research 
on the best alternatives. They can also partner government in the implementation of public 
policies through working within the structures of both the state and government or they may 
be contracted to implement policies on behalf of government in what is generally referred to as 
government by network (Kamarck, 2007). These public-NGO partnerships can take many forms, 
the most prominent are contracting-out and competitive tendering, franchising, joint ventures 
and strategic partnering (Skelcher, 2007). Contracting- out involves the separation between a 
service purchaser and the provider. In this case, the government is the purchaser and the NGO 
the provider. The government simply defines the services to be provided and the required 
standards and then gives the contract to an NGO to provide the services. This is done through 
competitive tendering and bidding (Ibid) to make sure government gets the best possible deal 
and for combating corruption. Franchising is when government awards a license to an NGO to 
provide public services and the provider’s income is in the form of user fees (Skelcher, 2007). In 
this scenario government only acts as a public- interest regulator. Joint ventures involve an 
NGO engaging in collaborative projects and programmes with government without necessarily 
surrendering its independence (Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002). Joint ventures enable the co-
ordination of important decisions by independent actors in respect of a project that is close- 
ended in terms of its scope and the commitment of partners’ resources (Skelcher, 2007). 
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Strategic partnering is when an NGO is involved in a partnership with no distinctive boundaries 
between the constituent parties. Organization and operations permeate both parties in order 
to yield mutually beneficial outcomes (Grimshaw et al, 2002). 
 
These partnerships enable NGOs to influence the way a policy is implemented. NGOs are closer 
to the grassroots hence they are generally acquainted with the needs, wants, interests and 
aspirations of communities, thereby making them the ideal agents for implementing 
government policies. These public-NGO partnerships minimize public policy implementation 
failure rampant in most sub-Saharan African countries. Government should set modalities to 
enable this to work. This requires a lot of networking and building relationships for the two 
entities (government and NGOS) to trust each other and be able to cooperate. This is enabled 
by the free flow of information without any restrictions which has not been the case with 
Zimbabwe. Draconian legislations like POSA, AIPPA, Broadcasting Services Act and the Official 
Secrecy Act have limited and restricted the exchange of information especially from the 
government. Coupled with the PVA Act, the majority of NGOs are in most cases suspicious of 
government intentions. Some NGOs accuse the government of snooping and spying with the 
intention of harming them (Dorman, 2001). Furthermore, NGOs are suspicious of losing 
autonomy and being dragged into government’s patronage system spurred on by the incentives 
involved in public-NGO partnerships. Such a milieu is never conducive for cooperation between 
government and NGOs.  
3.4.2 Fostering Accountability 
NGOs can also influence policy by holding government accountable. According to the Oxford 
Advanced Leaners Dictionary, accountability is being “responsible for your decisions or action 
and expected to explain them when you are asked (Hornby, 2010: 11). Accountability simply 
entails the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority 
(authorities) and are held responsible for their actions. NGOs demand accountability in order to 
improve service delivery, to see that funds are being used according to budgets, to ensure 
proper implementation of policies and to ensure government cuts its expenditure such that the 
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money saved will be channeled towards implementation of public policies which serve the 
interests of the poor. The most viable tactic under this strategy is policy monitoring and 
evaluation. NGOs embark on research initiatives, scrutinizing government performance, 
budgets and how public resources are being used. Research and scrutiny are possible when 
government is willing to disclose and share information on its operations with NGOs. With the 
current relationship between government and NGOs in Zimbabwe at its lowest ebb, NGOs face 
a Herculean task when trying to access such information. The Zimbabwean Official Secrecy Act 
and AIPPA can be likened to a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of would-be whistle 
blowers. Operating toll free lines for reporting corruption and government overspending can be 
employed to protect whistle blowers. However, NGOs are at risk of being deregistered under 
the PVA Act, and their officials risk being harassed and arrested on trumped-up charges if the 
government feels pressurized on accountability. NGOs can also take legal routes in order to 
access information and lobby for legislation on transparency. 
3.4.3 Policy Advocacy 
NGOs can also influence policy by lobbying government and its structures from outside. This is 
generally referred to as policy advocacy. Policy advocacy has many definitions depending on 
the context. One such definition is provided by Save the Children which defines advocacy as 
“action aimed at changing the policies, position and programmes of governments, institutions 
or organizations involving an organized, systematic influencing process on matters of public 
interest.  In addition, advocacy can be a social change process affecting attitudes, social 
relationships and power relations, which strengthens civil society and opens up democratic 
spaces”  (Save the Children Fund, 2000: 12). It involves a series of actions designed to persuade 
and influence those who hold governmental, political or economic power so that they will 
adopt and implement public policies in ways that benefit the poor and the less privileged who 
have less political power and fewer economic resources. Simply put, it involves trying to 
influence policy. Policies are characterized by stages which, in aggregate, are referred to as the 
policy cycle (Colebatch, 2002; Parsons, 1995). The policy cycle involves: policy agenda setting, 
problem identification and definition, alternative possible solutions and options to deal with 
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the problem (policy alternatives), decision making on the best possible solution (policy 
formulation and adoption), application of answers or solutions (policy implementation), policy 
monitoring and evaluation and possible amendments and adjustments to the policy and/or 
termination (Colebatch, 2002; Parsons, 1995). NGOs can influence the whole policy cycle or 
some parts of it. The rationality behind policy advocacy is that “many of the causes of 
underdevelopment lie in the political and economic structures of an unequal world- in trade, 
commodity prices, debt and micro-economic policy- in the distribution of land and other 
productive assets among different social groups; and in the misguided policies of governments 
and the multinational institutions they control” (Edwards and Hulme, 2002: 60). NGOs embark 
on policy advocacy as a way of creating public awareness and to improve the people’s quality of 
life through demanding better policy analysis from those who control political and/or economic 
power.  
 
There are generally two broad views on how NGOs can carry out policy advocacy. The one view 
represented by Esman and Uphoff (1984) involves liberal democratic notions of pluralism 
whereby NGOs avoid combative tactics and try to influence policy in a manner that does not 
create animosity and mistrust with government. Tactics under this view include, (1) 
collaboration with other NGOs, the private sector or the government, (2) networking and 
alliance building with other NGOs, the private sector or the government, (3) doing research and 
providing it as evidence to government showing the trajectory of a policy, (4) negotiations, (5) 
conducting seminars and conferences in which everyone interested is invited, (6) social 
marketing, and lobbying. As the ZANU (PF) led government aims to control all the spheres of life 
in the country, NGOs which employ such tactics risk being co-opted through a well-oiled 
patronage system operated by the government. The other view is represented by Paulo Freire’s 
ideas of mobilizing and educating the masses sees NGOs involved in radical formulations 
(sometimes violently) that are aimed at confronting oppressive social forces (Michael Edwards 
and David Hulme,2002). Tactics under this strategy include: (1) educating the public on the 
goings on of the policy, with or without consent from the government, (2) use of the media,(3) 
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demonstrations, (4) use of the courts (litigations), (5) exposure visits, (6) running an active 
website, (7) campaigning, (8) lobbying for sanctions, and (9) enforcing regime change. Radical 
formulations of policy advocacy run the risk of creating hostility between the NGO and the 
government especially in Zimbabwe where the relationship has become hostile and volatile. 
NGOs employing radical formulations risk being on the receiving end of brutality if they choose 
to confront the regime’s security apparatus. The brutalization of Lovemore Madhuku of the 
NCA, the disappearance of Jestina Mukoko of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (only to emerge in a 
frail state three months later) in 2008 and yet to be found journalist-cum-human rights 
campaigner, Itai Dzamara of Occupy Africa Unity Square being prominent examples. 
3.5 Land Policy in Zimbabwe 
A policy is simply “a plan of action agreed or chosen by a political party, a business, 
government” (Hornby, 2010: 1131). It is a statement of intent which is adopted and 
implemented in the interest of a nation. A statement of intent which is dear to Zimbabweans is 
the land issue because the country’s economy is agro-based. In the past, many wars have been 
fought as a result of land disputes in the country. Most of the young blacks who participated in 
the liberation war which heralded independence claim to have been motivated by the need to 
reclaim their forefathers’ land (Phiri, 2011). Land touches the hearts and minds of most 
Zimbabweans such that there is always need to equitably distribution it. However this has not 
been the case in the past two centuries, meaning land remains a contested issue in the country. 
There are basically two angles from which to view the land policy in Zimbabwe. The first is the 
actual statement of intent as spelled out in the country's constitution. Secondly, the way the 
statement of intent has been implemented. Therefore NGOs are involved in land policy to try 
and influence the statement of intent on the land issue and/or how the statement of intent has 
been implemented thus far.  
 
Land has always been a contested issue in the socio-political and economic landscape of the 
country. The arrival of the whites in late 20th century exacerbated the situation. The Southern 
Rhodesian government created thereafter made into law the Land Apportionment Act in 1930. 
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This act, together with the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (Worby, 2000), formed the basis of land 
policy in the country until independence in 1980. One major effect of the two Acts was that 
families were uprooted and moved away from land they owned for generations, to give way to 
the whites. The result was that at independence, more than 85% of prime land was owned by 
less than 15% of the population (Pazvakavambwa, 2007). Overpopulation in tribal and 
communal lands resulted in the war of liberation which culminated in the Lancaster House 
conference of 1979. The Lancaster House conference gave birth to the independence of 
Zimbabwe, however, during the negotiations, land was a thorny issue according to the 
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe (Phiri, 2011). The president contends that the impasse 
was only resolved when it was agreed that the country would embark on a land redistribution 
exercise based on a willing seller-willing buyer basis (Chaumba, 2003). Government accused 
white farmers of inflating the price of their land and hence moved to adopt the Land 
Acquisition Act in 1992. Its main objective was to remove the willing seller-willing buyer clause, 
limiting the size of farms and introducing a land tax (Moyo, 1999). The Act gave government 
sweeping powers to buy land compulsorily for redistribution, with some form of compensation 
paid. However, landowners could challenge the price set in the courts. Government claimed 
that court challenges (Moyo, 1999) and the failure of the British government to sponsor what 
they promised at the Lancaster House conference (which the British denied) (Phiri, 2011) 
frustrated the process, giving rise to the land invasions of 1999-2000. The British claimed they 
never agreed to sponsor the willing seller- willing buyer land reform programme. However, up 
until 1997, they donated to the Zimbabwean government a totals sum of thirty six million 
British pounds for resettlement. That amount was unaccounted for, forcing the British 
government to freeze its sponsorship (Phiri, 2011).  
 
A government sponsored referendum was defeated in February 2000 which would have meant 
compulsory acquisition of land, with compensation only for developments done on the piece of 
land in question. The government officially announced the Fast Track Land Redistribution 
Programme (FTLRP) as a policy in July 2000 and stated the need to acquire 3 000 farms for 
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redistribution. That same year, government, through the Presidential Powers Act, made into 
law what was rejected in the referendum. This heralded the FTLRP as a government policy 
embedded in the constitution. However the program has been dubbed chaotic and the cause of 
the country’s socio-political and economic problems. (Dorman, 2001). There are rampant 
accusations of nepotism, corruption, intimidations, harassments and patronage in the way the 
FTLRP has been implemented (Dorman, 2001). The former Zimbabwean Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture, Sylvester Nguni, addressing a meeting of the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) 
admitted that the program had been an utter failure because people without any experience of 
farming and who lacked capacity got the land, resulting in the decline of agricultural output 
(Meldrum, 2005) rendering Zimbabwe a basket case instead of being the bread basket of 
Southern Africa, a mandate the country was given during the creation of Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). The majority of Zimbabweans have no qualms about land 
redistribution in the country, what they are concerned about is the way the FTLRP has been 
implemented. The government itself admitted some errors with the FTLRP as it led to the 
creation of cell phone farmers and multiple farm owners (Utete, 2003). This created vast tracts 
of idle land which used to be productive, denying the country much needed foreign currency 
for development purposes, slowly withering away the good society created between 1980 and 
2000. The FTLRP and the politically motivated violence, harassment and intimidation that 
followed created an internally displaced population of more than 150 000 former farm workers 
(Refugees International, 2004). The violence, intimidation, harassment and the economic 
meltdown that followed caused millions of Zimbabweans to flee their country. In 2005, 
government undertook to destroy settlements- under operation Murambatsvina- literally 
translated as operation getting rid of filth- some of them built on land allocated under the 
FTLRP, leaving 700 000 households to live in the open during a freezing winter (Tibainjuka, 
2005). Hence it is up to NGOs to try and create the good society government has been eroding 






This section gave a definition of civil society in both the global and the Zimbabwean contexts. 
There are many reasons why human beings associate, want to participate and be involved in 
civil society. What is clear is that civil society offers a ‘third way’ in development and poverty 
reduction (a way outside of government and business). Civil society is not there to compete 
with government and business but rather to supplement the failures of the two in order to have 
a higher chance of achieving the common good. What is referred to as civil society is not 
uniform as it manifests itself in different forms. Edwards (2009) identifies civil society as an 
associational life, the good society and the public sphere which manifests themselves under the 
banner of three schools, namely: civic culture school, comparative associational school and the 
school of skeptics. Of importance to this study is the comparative associational school which 
sees civil society dealing with policy influence as a way of achieving the common good. What is 
referred to as civil society is broad, hence the section focused on one aspect which is a subset 
of the whole, that is, NGOs. According to Korten (1990), NGOs are grouped into three: 
generation one NGOs which focus on humanitarian issues, generation two NGOs which try to 
foster development by initiating, organizing and coordinating community sustainability through 
skills development, education and provision of small loans to start self-help projects. 
Generation three NGOs are those with the view that real sustainable development is only 
achieved when community sustainability initiatives are linked with national dreams, interest 
and aspirations, and the only way that those aspirations will serve the interests of those with 
little political power and fewer resources is by NGOs participating in public policy analysis. 
Strategies at the disposal of generation three NGOs are: partnering government in policy 
adoption and implementation, pressurizing government to be accountable, and working 
outside the government and its structures by involving themselves in policy advocacy. Two 
broader tactics characterize policy advocacy: one view represented by Esman and Uphoff 
(1984) tries to engage government in an open liberal democratic manner whereas the other 
represented by Paulo Freire’s ideas sees NGOs confronting government head-on, irrespective of 
the implications. This chapter also looked at the history of land policy in Zimbabwe to date, and 
highlighted how each policy had its own flaws. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will look at two case studies of how NGOs have been involved in land policy 
influence from year 2000 to 2015. The two case studies are the Commercial Farmers Union 
(CFU) and Justice for Agriculture (JAG). Land policy influence can take numerous strategies, 
however these strategies can be grouped into two categories: (1) liberal democratic approaches 
which aims to lobby government and minimizes animosity and mistrust between the 
government and the NGO and, (2) radical formulations which are aimed at taking government 
head-on. This chapter will unpack how CFU and JAG employed these two approaches in their 
land policy influence. When the land invasions started in 2000, CFU used radical formulations, 
however the ZANU (PF) led government was up to the challenge. After realizing that radical 
formulations are counterproductive, CFU turned to liberal democratic notions of land policy 
influence. However, CFU was fraught with problems such that it splintered in 2002 heralding 
the birth of JAG. CFU members who went and formed JAG were of the view that using liberal 
democratic notions of land policy influence when dealing with a rogue regime like ZANU (PF) 
was going to result in total failure. For that reason, from its formation, JAG was always involved 
in radical formulations and confrontational approaches.  
4.2 Case One: Commercial Farmers Union 
4.2.1 Background of the Commercial Farmers Union 
CFU has a long history. It was formed in 1943, however its history can be traced as far back as 
1892. The Rhodesian Farmers’ and Landowners’ Association was formed in 1892 by new settler 
farmers who saw the need for an organized body to represent and advance their interests. As 
the large commercial agricultural sector grew in the country, the demand for representation 
also grew, resulting in two main provincial bodies filling the void: the Matabeleland Farmers’ 
Association and the Rhodesian Agricultural Union based in Mashonaland. These two bodies 
merged in 1943 to form the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (RNFU). At independence in 
1980, the RNFU changed its name to the CFU of Zimbabwe. CFU’s main objective was to 
55 
 
empower farmers and by so doing ensuring the success of the country’s agricultural sector (CFU 
Website). However, as the land policy became a major government issue in subsequent years, 
the organization started to be involved in land policy analysis. 
4.2.2 Strategies employed by the Commercial Farmers Union 
CFU has employed two approaches to its land policy influence. When the land invasions started 
in 2000, just after the rejection of the government sponsored referendum, CFU employed 
radical formulations of land policy influence (Selby, 2006). Unfortunately for CFU, government 
reacted by being tough on its members and engaging in smear campaigns against the 
organization. When the going got tough, CFU realized that it was going to lose more by 
pursuing a confrontational approach, hence it changed strategy and started engaging 
government (Selby, 2006).  Government tried to change the land policy in Zimbabwe from the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1992 through a referendum. The rejected constitutional amendment 
was supposed to empower the government to acquire land on a compulsory basis and to 
withhold compensation except for developments made on the piece of land in question. 
Government accused CFU of working with the NCA and the newly formed opposition party, the 
MDC, to orchestrate the rejection of the referendum (Dorman, 2001). CFU members were 
personally accused of bussing their workers and families to polling stations to vote for NO 
(Selby, 2006). The referendum gave ZANU (PF), as the governing party, its first popular defeat in 
an election since independence. To make matters worse, there was a parliamentary election 
looming in June the same year and a presidential election in two years’ time. Sensing defeat in 
the upcoming elections, the ZANU (PF) led government, in alliance with self-styled war 
veterans, unlashed a campaign of terror against the white commercial farmers of whom the 
majority were CFU members (Dorman, 2001).  For the first time since independence, ZANU (PF) 
failed to win a majority in the House of Assembly. In a 120 member parliament, ZANU (PF) got 
62 seats, the infant opposition MDC 57 seats and ZANU Ndonga 1 seat. ZANU (PF)’s failure to 
garner the majority in parliament bolstered the regime’s resolve leading to subsequent 




4.2.2.1 Use of the Media 
For its part CFU, resorted to organizing its members to help each other in case of an invasion 
(Selby, 2006).  Farmers would film invasions of their farms and send the footage to 
international media houses like the BBC, CNN, and Sky News. They also used the internet to 
highlight their plight (Selby, 2006). They were doing this to publicize FTLRP’s disrespect of 
property rights in an effort to ensure accountability (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). CFU members 
were also working with international news agencies to gunner solidarity with the international 
community with the aim of making international organizations to put pressure on the 
government to stop the carnage on the farms and embark on an orderly land redistribution. 
One such international body which lived up to CFU expectations was the Commonwealth; 
however Robert Mugabe blasted the organization and pulled Zimbabwe out of its membership. 
Government reacted by banning international media houses which it considered hostile like the 
BBC, CNN and Sky News. Local news houses were harassed. For example, the Daily News 
printing house was bombed and the paper subsequently forced to close in 2003. It became 
difficult for white commercial farmers to raise their plight on the global stage (Selby, 2006). The 
government was taking the fight back to CFU. Government brought in the military and the 
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to dismantle and intimidate the would be participants in 
the CFU’s coordinated response, as well as harassing and intimidating media houses (Selby, 
2006; JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). Thus, CFU’s strategy of using the media received a setback.   
 
CFU had a running website which it used to post daily updates on the land invasion and those 
involved. The manner in which the invasions were taking place and the reluctance of the police 
to act pointed to the fact that the whole process was blessed and sanctioned from the very top 
of government’s corridors of power (Selby, 2006). In some instances CFU posted updates in 
which government vehicles were used to ferry invaders to farms (CFU Records, 2000). This was 
a way of showing the insincerity of the government, the corruption and deceit involved and 
abuse of public office and resources as the same government officials went on to occupy one 
farm after the other (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). Selby (2006) illustrates how the Inspector in 
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Charge of Concession district coordinated operations with the District Administrator who 
communicated directly with the Governor of the province. The invasions were well coordinated 
such that government officials supplied list of farms to be occupied (Selby, 2006). Members of 
the security agencies (army, CIO and police) were directly involved in some occupations (JAG 
and GAPWUZ, 2008). ZANU (PF) politicians and their employees were often seen assisting 
occupiers in the form of food and cash handouts to remain on the land (Alexander, 2003). In 
the worst cases, these security personnel, government officials, war veterans and ZANU (PF) 
politicians would vandalize one farm, sell anything that they could get hold of, move to the next 
farm and repeat the same strategy (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). In the initial stages of the 
invasions CFU would visit the farms affected, document all these episodes and post on their 
website (Alexander, 2003), as situation reports, in the belief that the government may change 
course or take those involved to task. Working in conjunction with the website was the CFU 
monthly magazine, The Farmer. However, when CFU abandoned its political involvement and 
returned to its pre-referendum apolitical stance it thought the magazine to be too politically 
involved therefore feared it would jeopardize any meaningful engagement with the 
government (Selby, 2006). As a result it was discontinued in 2002 only to emerge years later as 
the AgriZim magazine albeit in a diluted format which was dedicated to farming matters only 
(Theron, 2010). In 2006 CFU officially announced that it would make efforts to engage the 
ZANU (PF) led government (Selby, 2006). 
 
4.2.2.2 Litigation 
CFU made several challenges in the courts to the laws and policies governing the FTLRP. One 
such challenge was made in December 2000. The outcome was that the organization succeeded 
in obtaining an interdict from the Supreme Court- the highest court in the land by then- barring 
further land acquisition on the grounds that the program was unconstitutional as it was being 
carried out in a violent and chaotic manner (Human Rights Watch, 2002). However, since 2000, 
the Zimbabwean government had repeatedly ignored court verdicts which went against the 
FTLRP and basically resorted to criticizing and bullying the courts for standing in the way of land 
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reform in the country (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). Such tactics resulted in the forcible resignation 
of the then Chief Justice, Antony Gubbay and all white Supreme Court judges from the bench in 
2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The bench was replaced by individuals sympathetic to the 
regime (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In November 2001 the bench overturned the December 
2000 ruling by arguing that the amendments made to the constitution now gave the 
government powers to lawfully implement the FTLRP (Human Rights Watch, 2002). This was in 
line with arguments already given by the government that new legislation had retrospectively 
legalized occupations which had been carried out in violation of what were then the legal 
procedures (Supreme Court ruling, 2001).  
4.2.2.3 Regime Change 
The political heat reached its climax towards the winner takes all June 2002 presidential 
election. By this time, CFU was being accused by the government of peddling a regime change 
agenda as a strategy to reverse the FTLRP (Selby, 2006). This accusation was substantiated by 
footage taken from CNN, and continuously floated on national television, of CFU members 
signing cheques to finance the MDC’s presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai’s campaign 
(Selby, 2006). CFU publicly departed from its principles of apoliticism (Selby, 2006).  This was as 
a result of alienation of CFU from decision making processes on the issue of land, hence the 
organization saw fit to participate in the opportunity, brought by the referendum result, of 
installing another party in the echelons of power. This is illustrated by sentiments from a young 
white farmer: 
“When you consider the wider picture it was time for change. We had this vision of taking                                                                                                                                                 
Zimbabwe forward, of moving beyond the political, racial and economic claustrophobia that 
ZANU (PF) represented and this was the obvious opportunity” (quoted in Selby, 2006: 15).  
CFU realized that the only way to influence the direction taken by land policy in Zimbabwe was 
to participate in the broader public politics and ensure a victory for a different political party. 
The newly formed MDC supplied the opportunity. The thinking from CFU was that a different 
regime would listen to their suggestions, which was not the case with the arrogant ZANU (PF) 
(Selby, 2006). For the first time in the history of the country, blacks and whites were united in 
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their conviction that ZANU (PF)’s time was up. Even farm workers shared the fear of exclusion 
with their white bosses. They even joined forces with their bosses in mobilizing and 
orchestrating a counter eviction process, which was abruptly halted by the intervention of 
security forces (Selby, 2006).  
 
However CFU has always denied resisting land reform in Zimbabwe by claiming that what they 
were against was the way it was being implemented (Alexander, 2003) and therefore embarked 
on strategies to highlight abuses of human and property rights. According to Human Rights 
Watch, seven commercial farmers were murdered by war veterans before the hugely 
anticipated presidential election (Human Rights Watch, 2002).  
 
By the time the government of national unity was formed (bringing longtime foes ZANU (PF) 
and the two MDCs to govern together) after the controversial 2008 presidential election, a 
dozen white commercial farmers, their family members and farm workers were either 
murdered, maimed, harassed and/or intimidated with some having fled abandoning everything 
they had worked for their whole lives (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). In 2015, of the nearly 5 000 
CFU members less than 300 were still farming (Anglin, 2015).  
4.2.2.4 Lobbying and Engagement with Government 
As the FTLRP continued to escalate, fissures, cracks and disagreements started emerging in the 
CFU hierarchy (Selby, 2006). One camp realized that there was no going back on the FTLRP, 
hence they saw no merit in taking ZANU (PF) led government head-on. They encouraged a 
cautious approach, compromise and re-establishment of the communication channels with 
government which had broken down after the referendum (Selby, 2006). It should be noted 
however that CFU had never been pro-active in the distribution of land in Zimbabwe as 
illustrated by the CFU spokesperson Jerry Grant who argued that “while commercial farmers 
can be criticized for not doing enough earlier to avert the current crisis, there was no incentive, 
because the government was doing even less” (Selby, 2006: 17). CFU provinces like Manicaland 
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and Midlands proposed subdivisions or co-existence with the newly settled farmers. This 
heralded a new strategic approach from CFU culminating in the Commonwealth negotiations in 
Abuja, Nigeria, which gave birth to the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI) (Selby, 
2006). Under this initiative, CFU offered to give the government 562 farms for redistribution to 
landless people who would be assisted in their agricultural activities by the more experienced 
CFU members (Hughes, 2002). CFU members who still had outstanding cases in the courts were 
persuaded by moderate members of the government and ZANU (PF) to withdraw their cases. 
However hardliners and rogue elements within the regime resisted the initiative and continued 
with the chaotic farm occupations such that 31 percent of farms were experiencing total or 
partial work stoppages by September 2001 (Hughes, 2002). By the start of 2002, 1000 
commercial farms had completely stopped operations. Either the owners were denied access to 
their farms by occupiers or they had migrated to the city or abroad (Hughes, 2002).  
4.2.2.5 Partnerships with Government 
During the unity government with its ally, the MDC in government, and a new president in 
Charles Taffs, CFU revived its effort to engage and partner government in land reform. Marc 
Carrie- Wilson, CFU’s Legal Affairs Manager interviewed by Ngoni Chanakira of the Zimbabwean 
newspaper asserted that many things had changed within the CFU itself and the government 
(Chanakira, 2011). There was now new thinking within the CFU to work with the government to 
restore agricultural production (Chanakira, 2011). CFU saw the slight change in the corridors of 
state and government power as a window of opportunity to implement what they had started 
in 2001 with ZJRI. Their proposal to the government was still the same with ZJRI, that is, to offer 
pieces of land for resettlement and co-existence with their new found neighbors (Chanakira, 
2011). An outcome of the land redistribution policy was that the commercial farming sector 
was lacking in financial resources and knowledge. With farming colleges producing fewer 
farmers, CFU offered to assist the newly resettled farmers with financial backing and farming 
skills (Agribusiness Reporter, 2013). This sorry state of affairs is clearly highlighted by Charles 
Taffs (CFU President). Speaking to the Zimbabwe Independent, he said “fourteen years after the 
start of the fast-track (land reform) programme, people have access to land, but they cannot 
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raise the capital to farm. Production has consequently fallen and many farms lie idle” 
(Agribusiness Reporter, 2013). He went further to say, “there can be a skills transfer and co-
operation between the current land owners and the former owners, but the starting point is an 
acknowledgement by government that there is a conflict over land” (Agribusiness Reporter, 
2013).The greatest challenge faced by the newly resettled farmers was in the tobacco sector 
where a lot of resources, skills and techniques are needed to produce a leaf of high quality 
which is marketable. CFU even went further in proposing the creation of a Federation of 
Agricultural Unions, however government aligned unions which included the ZFU, ZCFU and the 
ZNFU rejected the idea (Agricultural Reporter, 2015). CFU wanted its proposals to government 
to be coordinated from one centre, and saw fit to create an alliance for that cause. Hardliners 
and rogue elements in the ZANU (PF) government always threw spanners in CFU’s works. 
Charles Taffs observed that the “authorities were aware of the problems in the agricultural 
sector and CFU’s proposal to tackle them, but meaningful progress is being hampered by 
political posturing ahead of this year’s crucial general elections” (Agribusiness Reporter, 2013). 
 
What had kept CFU together over these years was solidarity among its members. However, as 
the systematic onslaught on farms continued unabated, fissures and cracks started to emerge 
within the organization. ZANU (PF) employed a divide and rule tactic whereby farms belonging 
to CFU leaders remained unaffected (Selby, 2006). This angered the evicted farmers who 
wanted a confrontational approach whereas the leaders wanted to compromise (Selby, 2006). 
CFU started to fragment along various lines: ideology, region, crop type and farm structure 
(Selby, 2006). The ideological differences divided farmers into two camps: those who wanted to 
compromise and those who wanted to continue with the confrontational approach (Selby, 
2006). Those in the first camp comprised farmers not yet affected by the FTLRP and those in the 
second camp comprised farmers already evicted from their farms. The latter group broke away 





4.3 Case Two: Justice for Agriculture 
4.3.1 Background of Justice for Agriculture 
JAG was formed by disgruntled commercial farmers who thought that CFU was no longer a true 
representative of their views, interests and aspirations. They thought the organization was 
being diluted and neutralized by the government (Moyo, 1999). They opined that the route 
which was chosen by CFU of engaging the government would not yield the intended results. 
Therefore they formed JAG which is purely an advocacy organization in the area of agriculture 
(JAG Website). On its website, JAG is described as a crisis management group, set up by 
concerned Zimbabweans focusing on seeking a clear way forward on the land issue through the 
judiciary, whilst exposing corruption, callousness and recklessness of the Zimbabwean 
government’s current FTLRP.  JAG’s mission: 
 “is to secure justice, peace and freedom for the agriculture sector and to safeguard and support 
people directly affected by the FTLRP and to document and expose the injustices and human 
rights abuses being perpetrated against them under the guise of land reform. JAG intends to 
achieve this by offering to represent all stakeholders in the agricultural sector. This includes 
representation of potential new farmers who genuinely want to legitimize their position through 
the formation of coalitions with representative organizations. JAG incorporates the interests of 
commercial farm owners, their workers and industries which have anything to do with 
agriculture and their workers” (JAG Website).  
4.3.2 Strategies employed by Justice for Agriculture 
Some of the radical confrontationist formulations employed by JAG in their land policy 
advocacy include:  
4.3.2.1 Litigation 
JAG “believes in justice for agriculture in Zimbabwe and the unbiased application of just and 
constitutional laws that have received international approval” (JAG Website). JAG wants to see 
“procedural fairness in the way the land reform is implemented by ensuring that human and 
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property rights are observed” (JAG website). The organization intends to achieve this by the use 
of the courts. Since its formation, JAG has been involved in marathon court cases against the 
government within the country, the region and abroad (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 
2010). In May 2006, Mike Campbell, through his company, Mike Campbell Private Limited 
applied to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Amendment Number 17 
which prohibited the courts to deal with acquisition processes. Campbell argued that the 
amendment infringe the principles of human rights, democracy and the law (Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum, 2010). The Supreme Court delayed in giving judgment. Therefore, together 
with 77 other commercial farmers aligned to JAG, they approached the SADC tribunal based in 
Windhoek, Namibia. In a landmark ruling, The Tribunal ordered the government to stop seizing 
white owned farms and to compensate farmers already affected. Unfortunately for the 
farmers, the government didn’t honor the SADC Tribunal ruling (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum, 2010). Failure to honor the SADC Tribunal ruling prompted the case to be transferred to 
the Paris based International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in April 2009 
by Dutch nationals and in July 2010 by German nationals.  
 
The Dutch nationals argued that their properties were protected by Bilateral Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPA) in which the government promised to pay full 
compensation in disputes arising out of investments made by Dutch nationals (Bell, 2010). The 
Dutch group won its case; however the government did not feel obliged to provide 
compensation (Bell, 2010). Together with the 78 farmers who won their case at the SADC 
Tribunal, they approached the USA courts in order for the government properties to be 
attached to the purposes of compensation. In the USA courts, the farmers were demanding 
compensation as per ICSID and SADC Tribunal ruling, and also challenging the compulsory 
acquisition of their farms under the FTLRP (Mushava, 2013). The US courts ruled that US$25 
million belonging to the government-aligned ZB Bank be seized in order to compensate the 
farmers (Chigono, 2015). This prompted ZANU (PF) to make a u-turn on acquiring foreign farms 
at its December 2012 annual conference (Chigono, 2015). John Worsley-Worswick from JAG, 
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speaking to Alex Bell on Short Wave Radio Africa, elaborated that it was important for rulings to 
be made, despite the breakdown of the rule of law in the country as this was a temporary issue 
(Bell, 2010). He went further to say that “at some stage in the future the judiciary will have to 
be revamped and there will be a return to property rights” (Bell, 2010). Additionally, JAG in 
partnership with AfriForum approached South African courts to again force the government to 
abide by the SADC Tribunal ruling (Batt, 2015). They lodged their case at the Pretoria High court 
where the court ordered certain properties owned by the government in Cape Town to be 
seized. The Zimbabwean government approached the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Bloemfontein where it lost, and finally the Constitutional Court which directed the auctioning of 
the property worth US$278 000. JAG vowed to continue escalating the fight in the courts giving 
no room for abandoning that cause (Chigono, 2015).  
4.3.2.2 Use of the Media  
JAG “will expose and make accountable all persons actively destroying commercial agriculture 
under the guise of land reform” (JAG Website). JAG intended to achieve this by exposing those 
who are involved in corruption and clandestine means of land grabs (JAG website). JAG has 
been doing this by publishing their findings in mainstream media and its website. Working in 
alliance with the Mike Campbell Foundation, JAG investigated multiple farm owners of the 
FTLRP and posts their findings on their website or sends them to media houses for general 
public consumption. High profile investigations revealed that the man at the helm, Robert 
Mugabe, and his wife Grace have built a secret farming empire under Gushungo Holdings 
totaling 10 000 acres of land seized from five white owned farms and businesses in the 
Darwendale area. The investigation was written by Peta Thornycroft and Sebastien Berger for 
the Daily Telegraph of 25 September 2009 and subsequently posted on both the JAG and Mike 
Campbell Foundation websites. This was a ground breaking investigation such that by 2013 it 
was no longer a secret that Mugabe and his wife are now multiple farm owners and doing 
business under Gushungo Holdings, producing all sorts of milk products (Kuwaza, 2015). JAG 
also posted the investigations conducted by the Zimbabwe Independent newspaper (30 January 
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2014) of Grace Mugabe’s land grabs in Mazowe District of land belonging to Interfresh Mazoe 
Citrus Estate (Staff Writer, 2014).  
4.3.2.3 Doing Research 
In its explosive document entitled “Destruction of Zimbabwe’s Backbone Industry in Pursuit of 
Political Power: A Qualitative Report on Events in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farming Sector Since 
the Year 2000” (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008), JAG conducted extensive research documenting 
individuals involved in land occupations. The research revealed that the government’s claim 
that land was allocated to landless poor is false. The document showed that the majority of 
land went to members of the political elite and well connected individuals who now own more 
than one farm. The conclusion drawn by the document is that the whole programme was 
designed to buttress a well-oiled patronage system run and managed by ZANU (PF). The 
document also gives a detailed account of human and property rights violations unleashed 
against commercial farmers, their workers and their families during the occupations.  By 
investigating and exposing corruption and lawlessness with which the FTLRP was undertaken, 
JAG hope to make government realize that the way the programme has been implemented is 
counterproductive. According to JAG’s estimates, the FTLRP has affected 350 000 families of 
full-time employees and 250 000 seasonal or casual workers coupled with a net loss in the 
region of US$8.4 billion experienced by commercial farmers themselves (JAG and GAPWUZ, 
2008). This destroyed innocent livelihoods on the farms where a majority of people had 
nowhere to go as the farms had been their homes the whole of their lives. Zimbabwe has an 
agro based economy such that the destruction on farms had a devastating effect on the 
economy which has plummeted since then, resulting in the unwarranted suffering of the 
majority of people. Some escaped to neighboring countries and overseas with the 2012 census 
results estimating that a quarter of the population is now living outside the country. The major 
reasons for leaving are the need to seek greener pastures and running away from human and 





4.3.2.4 Collaboration and Regime Change 
Due to its quest for a long term sufficient food security for the country, JAG undertook to work 
with former farm workers for skills transference. The organization, just like every Zimbabwean, 
believes that land is a precious natural resource which should be used productively if the 
country is to move forward. The need for productivity on farms has prompted JAG to “work to 
keep agricultural skills on the land and in the country and to find innovative ways to increase 
production whilst working towards recovery of the sector” (JAG website). These include good 
farming techniques and technical knowhow on general farming practices. JAG intends to 
achieve this by encouraging its successful members to share their knowledge, expertise and 
skills with those who wish to follow suit (JAG website). Unlike the CFU, JAG works with the 
former farm workers without involving government. Furthermore, in order to secure long term 
food security for the country, like the CFU in the early 2000s, JAG is in support of a regime 
change agenda or transforming the current regime to embrace democratic principles, respect 
human and property rights and constitutionalism. This is highlighted by the statement on JAG’s 
website which reads, “JAG supports a duly elected and democratic government whilst refuse to 
be transformed into political apologists” (JAG Website). JAG supports a government ready to 
embrace democratic principles including respect for human and property rights essential for 
development.  
4.4 Conclusion 
CFU and JAG employed different strategies of influencing the land policy in Zimbabwe between 
2000 and 2015. CFU, as the mother organization, employed two broader strategies during this 
time. With the commencement of farm invasions immediately after the rejection of the 
February 2000 government sponsored referendum, CFU employed confrontational approaches 
to land policy influence. These confrontational approaches included: the use of the media, the 
use of the CFU website, the internet and the Farmer magazine, litigations and regime change 
agenda. However as the reality started unfolding that ZANU (PF) was going nowhere any time 
soon, CFU realized that it was counterproductive to continue confronting the regime. It started 
softening its stance and started employing strategies which did not threaten the regime. Such 
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strategies include lobbying and engagement as well as working in partnership with the 
government. In 2002, disgruntled CFU members who thought that engaging the ZANU (PF) 
regime would not yield the intended results, broke away and formed JAG. JAG resolved to have 
nothing to do with working with the government on land reform. Instead, it used 
confrontational strategies. Chief among its strategies was litigation. It was involved in 
numerous court cases in the country, the region and abroad. In the majority of its cases, JAG 
won but the government rebuffed the court rulings. Some of JAG’S strategies include: the use 
of the media and the internet, doing research and publishing the findings for public 
consumption, and the use of collaboration, regime change agenda and calling for sanctions. It’s 
still to be seen how these strategies from both CFU and JAG will influence land policy in 
Zimbabwe as all have failed, thus far. ZANU (PF) led government is yet to abandon its FTLRP 














CHAPTER FIVE: PROBLEMS FACED BY ZIMBABWEAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS 
5.1 Introduction 
Zimbabwean NGOs faced a plethora of problems between year 2000 and 2015. Some problems 
came from outside and others from within the NGOs themselves. This chapter will unpack the 
problems faced by Zimbabwean NGOs during this trying period. The problems are grouped into 
two: those coming from outside of NGOs: most of these are as a result of the environment in 
which the NGOs found themselves working. They were created by the political situation 
prevailing at the time. The ZANU (PF) led government had a lot to do with that environment. 
The second group consists of problems which arose within NGOs themselves. Solutions to these 
two groups of problems are hard to achieve considering the socio-political and economic 
environment during this period however, NGOs have to make a lot of effort to try and eliminate 
some of the problems. Some can be solved easily; however, if left unattended they have 
devastating effects on the capacity and effectiveness of NGOs in influencing public policies. For 
that reason, this chapter offers some of the possible solutions.  
5.2 Problems from Outside  
The biggest problem Zimbabwean NGOs encounter and endure is the political terrain in which 
they operate. The ZANU (PF) regime devised tactics aimed at crushing dissent and NGOs were 
often on the receiving end of these tactics. These tactics seriously affected NGOs’ operations in 
public policy influence. 
5.2.1 Government’s Repressive Laws 
After the NO vote in the government sponsored referendum, ZANU (PF) became pre-occupied 
with its own survival in power (Tendi, 2010). The rejection of the referendum for which the 
government vehemently campaigned forced ZANU (PF) to press the panic button. The party 
became determined to win elections at all costs (Selby, 2006). The situation was exacerbated by 
rural areas which overwhelmingly voted NO, despite being the stronghold of the regime since 
independence. Government’s first reaction was to change the rules of the game. Draconian 
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legislation like the Broadcasting Services Act, AIPPA, POSA and the Official Secrecy Act were 
railroaded through parliament. These pieces of legislation had a detrimental effect on the 
operation of NGOs in the country. POSA made it difficult for NGOs to exercise civil rights as any 
gathering needed to be sanctioned by the police. The Police Commissioner General, Augustine 
Chihuri, disclosed openly that he is a staunch ZANU (PF) supporter (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). 
NGOs were left to the mercy of a partisan police force which acted with impunity.  
 
Moreover, the Official Secrecy Act made it difficult for NGOs to gather information especially on 
government business. Even if NGOs were successful in gathering such information, AIPPA was 
there to guard against publication and disclosure of such information. The informant and the 
publisher risked jail sentences, a heavy fine or both under AIPPA. The situation was worsened 
by the already functioning PVA Act aimed at checking any form of NGO dissent. Freedom of 
association, movement and speech are the principles which makes NGOs strong, desirable and 
a possible alternative to government and the market. Therefore, NGOs’ impact is generally 
diminished if their members have no freedom to gather and move: they are restricted in the 
areas of research, information gathering, publishing of important findings and communicating 
with the public. As noted in the previous chapter, this is the fate which befell CFU. In the initial 
stages of the FTLRP, CFU members would take videos and photographs of land invaders and 
sent them to media houses and the West swiftly reacted by imposing travel bans on prominent 
ZANU (PF) members. However the government reacted by banning international news agencies 
like BBC, CNN and Sky News. Local journalists and news houses deemed unsympathetic to the 
regime were harassed and intimidated (Selby, 2006). The most prominent example of 
intimidation was the bombing of the Daily News and its subsequent forcible closure in 2003. 
After both local and international media houses were mercilessly dealt with, CFU’s strategy of 
informing the world about what was happening on the farms was partially crippled. The only 
form of communication with the masses left at CFU’s disposal was the internet to which the 
majority of Zimbabweans had no access. As gatherings were prohibited without prior consent 
from the police, internet posting became only an individual affair (Selby, 2006). CFU members 
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could not visit an invasion scene as a group without raising the eyebrows of the police who 
would not hesitate to make an arrest for contravention of POSA. 
5.2.2 Infiltration 
The accusation leveled against CFU by its members who went on to form JAG was that the 
organization was infiltrated by the CIO which acts as the eyes and ears of ZANU (PF) (Selby, 
2006). What troubled members of CFU was the involvement of well-known ZANU (PF) 
sympathizer, John Bredenkamp, in the co-existence initiative (Pilossof, 2011). CFU members 
who went on and formed JAG felt that CFU was softening its stance only because it had been 
compromised. What betrayed CFU was the fact that farms belonging to its leaders were left 
unaffected, thus raising some doubts about the capacity of the organization, to represent 
members whose farms were already occupied (Selby, 2006). ZANU (PF) has the intention to 
control every aspect of Zimbabwean life. It achieved this by deploying a partisan security force 
hell bent on protecting the regime at whatever cost (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). One strategy 
they use is by keeping in check organizations- business, opposition political parties, and civil 
society- they feel are troublesome. Furthermore, the regime uses its patronage system to 
silence NGO leaders (Kuwaza, 2015; Dorman, 2001). The effect of patronage is that the 
organization in question exists in name without really doing anything to achieve its objectives. 
Therefore it is up to NGOs and their leaders to remain vigilant by staying away from ZANU (PF)’s 
gravy train. With the economic hardships experienced since the farm invasions, there is great 
temptation for NGOs and their leaders to try and keep things afloat by accepting incentives 
from the regime.  
5.2.3 Smear campaign 
NGOs and their leaders who resisted being lured onto ZANU (PF)’s gravy train were targeted by 
well calculated smear campaigns. At the forefront of this strategy was the regime’s spin doctor, 
former Information and Publicity Minister and the perceived author of AIPPA, POSA and the 
Broadcasting Services Act, Jonathan Moyo (Muchayi, 2014). Anyone who did not tow the 
party’s line was systematically labeled a sellout, working with external forces to derail the 
people’s will and power by peddling a regime change agenda. Immediately after the onset of 
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the invasions of white commercial owned farms, CFU and its members were labeled ‘settlers’ 
who robbed the black indigenous people of their land, hence had no right to own land in the 
country (Pilossof, 2011; Selby, 2006). The smear campaigns escalated when CFU members were 
seen on CNN donating cash to the MDC’s candidate for the 2002 presidential election. It is 
believed Mugabe was furious and accused the CFU of biting the hand that feeds them (Shaw, 
2005). The incident sparked a well- orchestrated smear campaign to discredit CFU. The 
organization was labeled the enemy of the people, and accused of being used by Britain, USA 
and their allies to continue neo-colonialism aimed at plundering the county’s resources (Shaw, 
2005). The national radio and television, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), and 
national newspapers run by state owned Zimpapers (The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The 
Chronicle, and Kwayedza) were transformed into ZANU (PF) mouth pieces. Journalists who did 
not toe the line were annihilated, replaced by well-known ZANU (PF) sympathizers (Dzamara, 
2005). Jonathan Moyo went to great lengths to ensure that ZTV and Zimpapers’ top posts were 
filled with ZANU (PF) lieutenants who initiated a propaganda war against perceived ‘enemies’ of 
the regime (Dzamara, 2005). Independent radios and televisions were banned under the 
Broadcasting Services Act, with their counterparts in the print media enduring everyday 
harassment and intimidation under POSA and AIPPA. International news agencies 
unsympathetic to the regime were banned and expelled from the country (Tendi, 2010).  
 
CFU was compelled to adopt a defensive strategy instead of focusing on its mandate given to it 
by its members. In the eyes of the majority of Zimbabweans, especially the not-so-well 
informed rural folks, CFU was a sellout with no right to land claims in the country.  Even the 
violent way in which some of the invasions took place is testimony to the fact that the invaders 
were brainwashed to think CFU members were not part of the Zimbabwean population 
(Pilossof, 2011 Selby, 2006). In most cases, CFU members were told to go back where they 
came from regardless of the fact that they were the third or fourth generation in their lineage 
born and bred in Zimbabwe (JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008). An environment in which national news 
agencies were turned into being partisan agents of government presents a serious problem for 
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NGOs working in the country. The situation is worsened by the banning of independent radios 
and television. With the banning of independent radios- one of the cheapest means of mass 
communication- the rural poor are deprived of vital information which enables them to make 
informed choices. The majority of the Zimbabwean population live in rural areas which does 
not help NGOs’ cause. NGOs operating in the country need to come together, speak with one 
voice and pressure government to loosen its monopoly, open the airwaves and bring in 
genuinely independent players.   
5.2.4 Harassment and Intimidation 
Since ZANU (PF) pressed the panic button after the February 2000 referendum, well-
orchestrated strategies of making citizens toe its line were put in motion (Tendi, 2010). The 
strategies were designed in such a way that if one misses the other will get the target. Two 
devastating strategies unleashed on the people were harassment and intimidation. These two 
strategies aimed at breaking the resolve of CFU and its members took many forms (Pilossof, 
2011; Selby, 2006). The ugliest form of harassment involved physical harm: in worst case 
scenarios, farmers paid the ultimate price. White commercial farmers, their workers and 
families were killed during farm invasions (Selby, 2006). Pungwes (singing and dancing all night 
long) were done outside the bedroom windows of CFU members to traumatize them (Selby, 
2006). Small kids at school could be abused and harassed by fellow kids whose parents 
occupied their farms (Selby, 2006). Even pets and animals belonging to white commercial 
farmers were not spared. Dogs could be severely beaten and killed in front of their owners as a 
warning. Farmers lost cattle and horses through body mutilation. In cases where the farmers 
organized retaliation units, the army and the CIO were brought in to crush the initiatives 
(Pilossof, 2011; JAG and GAPWUZ, 2008; Selby, 2006).  
 
ZANU (PF) leaders encouraged harassment and intimidation of CFU members as evidenced by 
Mugabe who declared that their party “must strike fear in the heart of the white man. They 
must tremble” (quoted in Selby, 2006: 1). Joselyn Chiwenga, the wife of the Zimbabwean army 
commander, declared that she had not tasted white blood for a very long time and she eagerly 
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wished to do so (Selby, 2006). The former Vice President, Joyce Mujuru encouraged ZANU (PF) 
youth militia and war veterans to come back from farms with shirts soaked in white man’s 
blood (Selby, 2006). CFU had no one to turn to as the government and ZANU (PF) officials 
openly declared war against it. In order to save their lives, CFU members would just abandon 
everything on the farms and migrate to towns, cities, neighboring countries and some even 
abroad. They couldn’t take the harassment and intimidation any longer as it had serious 
psychological effects on them and their families, the very effect ZANU (PF) wanted (Selby, 
2006). NGOs in Zimbabwe have a mammoth task in dealing with the issues of harassment and 
intimidation. The fact that such tactics are systematically planned, authorized and executed 
with the blessing from above makes the work even harder to achieve. In most cases involving 
NGOs or their leaders who don’t toe government’s line, the police are slow to act if they act at 
all. The police itself has been involved in cases of harassment of civil society leaders for 
instance, the assault on Morgan Tsvangirai and Lovemore Madhuku during a rally at the 
Zimbabwe Grounds (Gonye, 2007). 
 
These problems are attributable to a rogue, autocratic and authoritarian regime lacking 
legitimacy (Tendi, 2010). As such, they present a huge challenge. NGOs and civil society at large 
need to come together, join forces and try to dismantle the system. NGOs in Zimbabwe tend to 
distrust each other, due to competition for resources. Consequently, they are always divided on 
issues which, if they joined forces, help them. As the old adage says, a house divided won’t 
stand, Zimbabwean NGOs won’t withstand ZANU (PF), a well-greased oppressive machine, if 
they continue being divided. NGOs as people’s power can work together and force oppressive 
regimes to change. The respective cases of what happened in the Eastern bloc and Latin 
America in the 1980s provide two examples (among others) that a united civil society is able to 





5.3 Problems from Within  
As far as the ZANU (PF) led government caused problems for NGOs in the country, some of the 
problems were created by NGOs themselves. NGOs can easily deal with problems from within if 
they can be focused and organized. 
5.3.1 Lack of Resources 
Zimbabwean NGOs are hamstrung by the lack of resources. For NGOs to properly fulfill their 
membership’s mandate, members have to contribute to the day to day running of the 
organization. The economic meltdown sparked by the FTLRP eroded the economic power of the 
already poor majority. The general population was left to struggle for daily survival, with 
nothing left to contribute towards NGOs. Families started surviving from hand to mouth, 
eroding the time and resources one could spare for NGO activities. Even the once rich farmers 
whose businesses where disrupted by farm inversions were not spared. As the number of CFU 
members whose farms were affected increased, monthly contributions to the organization 
dwindled. Those who broke away and formed JAG stopped the monthly contributions 
altogether in protest (Selby, 2006). The CFU administration and its Board of Trustees 
acknowledged that another reason why The Farmer magazine was discontinued was a lack of 
resources to sustain its continued existence (Pilossof, 2011). It only surfaced in 2010 as AgriZim 
magazine after CFU had secured funding from the European Union (Pilossof, 2011). This 
highlights that Zimbabwean NGOs sometimes fail to operate at their full capacity because of 
lack of resources. Use of the media is one of the most powerful strategies NGOs can use to 
influence policy and communicate with its members and the general populace at large; 
however in this case CFU was forced to close its only magazine which was part of itself since 
1943. 
 
Just like the general population, after the economic downturn from 2000 onwards, NGOs also 
started surviving from hand to mouth. The only option left for NGOs was to appeal for financial 
help from their Northern counterparts and the donor world. However the help would come 
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with strings attached, adversely affecting the objectives of the NGOs involved. CFU suffered this 
problem as evidenced by its operations around 2002 being directly the opposite of what the 
majority of its members wanted. Instead of NGOs fulfilling their members’ mandate they would 
become preoccupied with fulfilling the wishes of their sponsors, creating a conflict of interest. 
As the economic crisis continued unabated, the most skilled human capital started seeking 
greener pastures. NGOs were not spared either, although they were better off than the rest of 
the country as they could attract the best skills because of the incentives they offered in the 
form of sought-after foreign currency. Nevertheless the skills flight adversely affected NGOs’ 
capacities, just like the rest of the country, especially in third generation NGOs involved in 
policy analysis. Policy analysis needs different kinds of skills for problem identification, agenda 
setting, choosing the best possible answer among alternatives, adoption, implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation of public policies. When these skills are lacking, NGOs work is 
negatively affected.  
5.3.2 Absence of the Culture of Volunteerism 
NGOs in Zimbabwe are affected by the erosion of the culture of volunteerism. Sub- Saharan 
Africans in the past were well known for caring for the welfare of the other through their 
notion of ubuntu. However since 2000 when the economy started shrinking, inflation and 
unemployment rate sky rocketing, most people were severely affected. As earlier noted, people 
were concerned and pre- occupied with putting bread at their families’ table. No time was left 
for doing other things outside the sphere of fending for one’s family. NGOs as organizations 
joined voluntarily suffered considerably. Lack of volunteerism was the Achilles heel of CFU at 
the height of the FTLRP. As farm invasions went on unabated, CFU members did not have the 
time to participate in the organization’s activities as they were pre-occupied with their future 
on the farms. Some started selling their merchandise and farming equipment to clear the way 
to start a new life elsewhere. ZANU (PF)’s victory in the 2002 presidential election gave some 
members no hope for the future in farming. Their future was completely obliterated with the 
only hope in life elsewhere. That exhaustion affected their zeal and will-power to continue 
taking part in CFU activities. According to Selby (2006), they saw participation as a waste of 
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time as they had realized that they were dealing with an animal (ZANU (PF)) which has no 
regard, whatsoever, for the rules of the game. They realized that there was no value in dealing 
with a regime which continues shifting goal posts willy-nilly.  
 
NGOs in Zimbabwe have to revive the culture of euphoria, zeal and willingness to volunteer, a 
situation which prevailed between the campaigns for a NO vote during the government 
sponsored February 2000 referendum and the March 2002 presidential election. During this 
period, there was unanimity among Zimbabweans, from all walks of life, for the need to create 
a good society in which everyone benefits. Besides being disillusioned by the presidential 
elections results, people started losing hope in NGOs as they were seen as having failed to end 
ZANU (PF) oppressive rule. NGOs in Zimbabwe have substantial work to do in order to win 
people back to the volunteerism culture which prevailed prior to the 2002 presidential election. 
They need to be seen operating in ways which doesn’t leave question marks in the minds of the 
general public. One way of achieving this is for NGO leaders to listen to the will of their 
members. Failure to listen to the views and wishes of members resulted in the split in the rank 
and file of CFU. 
5.3.3 Lack of a Clear Vision 
Zimbabwean NGOs are plagued by a lack of vision (Moyo, 1999; Makumbe 1998). This is 
because many of their leaders are would-be politicians. They join NGOs to build their 
curriculum vitae which they think will propel them into national politics. The problem is that 
NGOs, just like Zimbabwe’s political system, built their success around individuals such that 
their departure unravels the organization in terms of vision and a way forward (Sachikonye, 
1995). By the time they rebuild the organization around another individual, the damage created 
by a lack of vision has been done. Unfortunately the damage is very difficult to reverse as the 
general public has been disillusioned with NGOs since the 2002 presidential election results. 
Another factor which confuses the vision of Zimbabwean NGOs is the issue of donors 
(Makumbe, 1998). When an NGO is formed it usually has a clear vision. However, when it seeks 
partnerships with Northern NGOs and donor agencies, visions are changed or tilted by trying to 
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accommodate the demands, wishes and aspirations of new found partners (Makumbe, 1998; 
Sachikonye, 1995). Given a choice between changing, tilting or confusing their visions and 
objectives and leading themselves to extinction due to lack of resources, leaders of 
Zimbabwean NGOs opt for the former. They are further motivated by incentives which come 
with partnering Northern NGOs and donor agencies, to sacrifice the independence of their 
organizations (Pilossof, 2011). The same problem also befalls those who want to partner the 
government. As a regime with the intention to control its destiny, it makes every effort to dilute 
visions and objectives of NGOs it partners and thinks will jeopardize its ambitions (Moyo, 1993). 
NGO leaders tend to change the trajectory of NGOs for personal aggrandizement, creating an 
environment conducive to a head-on collision with the organization’s members (Selby, 2006). 
For example, the lack of a clear vision caused by leaders who wanted to save their farms 
created problems in the CFU leading to its fragmentation (Selby, 2006).  
 
NGOs operating in Zimbabwe in most cases are reactive rather than pro-active (Moyo, 1999, 
Makumbe, 1998; Moyo, 1993). They rarely initiate policies, they wait for government to roll 
whatever it is prepared to offer and then start criticizing, in some cases without giving 
substantive alternatives. When the PVA was being debated in parliament, NANGO failed to 
even inform its members on what was happening (Dorman, 2001). Likewise since 1980, CFU is 
accused of having done nothing to help government in land reform programmes (Selby, 2006). 
It only sprang into action when things started going wrong for its members. Unfortunately, it 
went into uncharted territory without a clear vision such that in a space of two years, from 
2000 to 2002, it had employed numerous and divergent strategies to try and influence the land 
policy. By the time it proposed the co-existence strategy, the damage on farms had already 
been done. If CFU had been pro-active, it would have known what was coming, however it was 
in the dark as it was not involved much in previous land policies. Zimbabwean NGOs need to be 
pro-active in policy analysis rather than sitting back and expect things to just happen. Being 
pro-active means NGOs are always well-informed about what is happening in policy arenas, 
thereby avoiding a situation where they are caught unaware and unprepared. Being pro-active 
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also offers a rogue regime like ZANU (PF) assurances that NGOs are there to help and not just to 
try and effect regime change.  
 
Zimbabwean NGOs need leaders who always contact themselves in an above board way, 
leaders who always consult their members before making important decisions. CFU 
administrators and the Board of Trustees were accused by the organization’s members for 
acting unilaterally on the closure of The Farmer magazine (Pilossof, 2011). People who 
participate in NGOs are running away from lack of consultation in government and business. It’s 
unacceptable to subject them to the same conditions they are running away from. NGOs’ case 
is made even worse since membership is by choice, members are free to withdraw if they feel 
sidelined. It’s not evil in itself to partner Northern NGOs and donor agencies which come with 
their demands and expectations, but members need to be consulted and agree to the 
proposals. If sufficiently consulted, they feel that they part of the decision making process, 
which is the very motive people are involved in NGOs. Nevertheless NGOs need to make efforts 
to source their own resources. Although hamstrung by skills flight, they should try to venture 
into consultation work in order to raise funds on their own without surrendering their 
independence. The same applies to leaders who build personality cults in NGOs. They sideline 
members who are the heartbeat of their organizations. Members’ failure to participate ends 
life of these organizations. NGOs should have constitutions which govern everyday operations 
of their organizations, and should be adhered to. This prevents a situation where one or a few 
leaders take the whole organization as their personal property. Constitutions prevent abuse of 
office and resources which have the propensity to negatively affect NGOs. 
5.3.4 Fragmentation of Zimbabwean Non-Governmental Organizations 
The majority of third generation Zimbabwean NGOs starts as tribal, regional or racial pressure 
groups (Moyo, 1999; Makumbe; 1998; Moyo, 1993). This is another reason why they at times 
lack a clear vision as they try to incorporate members from the broader spectrum. Squabbles 
usually arise when the original tribal, regional or racial members feel that their voices are being 
ignored. When CFU was formed it was an amalgamation of different farmers’ organization, such 
79 
 
that when things got tough, the original regional farmers’ organizations started operating as 
independent entities (Selby, 2006). For instance, when other members rejected the co-
existence proposal, CFU regions of Manicaland and Matabeleland went and negotiated with 
government alone. They were followed by tobacco growers, daily farmers, cattle ranchers, 
safari owners and eventually estate farmers (Selby, 2006). Those whose farms were already re-
possessed saw no merit in all these endeavors and went on to form JAG, which they thought 
would represent their interests. At independence there was only one organization, CFU, 
representing commercial farmers’ interests, but by 2005 there were five: CFU, JAG, ZTA, SACFA 
and Agric Africa. Even before that internal split, CFU was always accused of representing the 
interests of white commercial farmers at the expense of their black counterparts (Moyo, 1999). 
Black farmers went on to form their own organizations in order to represent their own interests 
(Moyo, 2005). CFU’s proposal to merge all farmers’ organization into one entity was shot down 
as black organizations thought they would be working with the ‘other’. A house divided 
wouldn’t stand the test of time and an oppressive regime like ZANU (PF) would use such 
fragmentation as well as regional, tribal and racial based orientations as an excuse to refuse 
engagement. NGOs need to have a national appeal by uniting around a common purpose.     
5.3.5 Power Hungriness of Non-Governmental Organizations’ Leaders 
As the economy continued plummeting, because NGOs were partnering their Northern 
counterparts or donor agencies, they became one of the sectors which offered lucrative 
incentives (Dorman, 2001). Professionals were attracted by the incentives and viewed joining 
NGOs as a career prospect. Most NGO leaders became entrenched in their positions for fear of 
losing the benefits which came with those leadership positions (Dorman, 2001). Some 
continued clinging to their leadership positions as a way of covering up their malpractices and 
financial mismanagement (Dorman, 2001), and others for using their organizations to pursue a 
personal agenda. This was the accusation leveled against the CFU leadership by those who 
broke away and formed JAG (Pilossof, 2011; Selby, 2006). JAG itself has not been spared from 
leadership differences. Since its formation, JAG has been rocked by leadership differences 
which severely affected its operations with its future hanging in the balance (Pilossof, 2011). 
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Leaders of Zimbabwean NGOs need to put their organizations’ interests before their own 
personal interests. General members are encouraged when they see that their leaders are also 
personally sacrificing for the sack of the organization. This can be achieved by realizing that 
NGOs are not for personal gain like business but rather for the good of everyone involved. 
People who participate in NGOs are running away from the government and business because 
those entities have been transformed into personal properties. It will be unfortunate for NGOs 
to meet the same fate. 
5.3.6 Leaders of Non-Governmental Organizations Performing Multiple Roles. 
Often, NGO leaders are involved in many activities outside of the organization. Some 
professionals see NGOs as part-time employment. They usually have their own jobs and 
become involved in NGOs as a way of broadening their careers or earning extra cash. Because 
of the skills flight in the country, NGOs were forced to look for professionals doing other things 
elsewhere in areas which needed technical expertise. Such leaders most often would not care 
much if the organization goes under as they are only there for personal gain. Of course, NGOs 
are formed and joined by people doing other things elsewhere; however, in their case it’s 
voluntary. Members volunteer to be part of NGOs and as such will always have the interest of 
the organization at heart, unlike members who are looking for career prospects. They may be 
dedicated to the organization’s cause, but if push comes to shove, they won’t hesitate to look 
after their own interests and, at times, at the expense of the organization. NGOs need to look 
from within for leaders, in other words, from members who joined the organization voluntarily. 
Such members in most cases will put the organization first. When the CFU leadership of David 
Hasluck, Tim Henwood and William Hughes realized that they were hampering progress, they 
offered to resign (Selby, 2006).  They realized that they had to sacrifice themselves for the sake 
of the organization. Such has been the strength of CFU as it chooses its leaders from within. 
 
Problem of NGO leaders performing many roles is catastrophic when one of the roles has to do 
with national politics. ZANU (PF) does not care if such leaders are aligned to their party; it 
becomes a problem if they are in opposition politics (Dorman, 2001; Moyo, 1993). If NGOs are 
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in opposition politics, they are blackmailed and treated just like opposition parties are treated 
in Zimbabwe. The fallout between ZANU (PF) led government and CFU was precipitated by CFU 
members’ involvement in the MDC (Selby, 2006; Dorman, 2001). Plenty of CFU members were 
heavily involved in opposition politics by the turn of the millennium. The most prominent ones 
were Roy Bennet, MDC MP for Chimanimani (2000- 2005) and MDC Treasurer General (2005-
2014), and Ian Kay MDC MP for Marondera Central (2008- 2013) and MDC Social Welfare 
Secretary (2009-2013). Roy Bennet was subsequently jailed for a year for pushing ZANU (PF) 
legislator, Patrick Chinamasa, in parliament. Since then he has been living in exile in South 
Africa. His nomination for the post of Deputy Minister of Agriculture during the unity 
government, between 2009- 2013 was vehemently opposed and subsequently derailed by 
Robert Mugabe and ZANU (PF). In a politically volatile milieu like Zimbabwe, NGO leaders need 
to choose where they want to belong. If they fail to do so, they risk a situation whereby the 
organizations they lead are viewed as opposing government and peddling a regime change 
agenda. Any policy influence initiative they want to venture into will be viewed by government 
as a strategy of trying to effect regime change.    
5.4 Conclusion 
All the problems cited in this chapter, when put together, weaken Zimbabwean NGOs 
institutionally. These problems make NGOs entities built on quicksand, making their sinking a 
fait accompli. The most challenging problems are those created by government. Government is 
always miles ahead of NGOs in terms of resources, hence NGOs need to do more in order to 
deal with such challenges. Some of the problems created by government hindering and 
restricting NGOs between 2000 and 2015 include: repressive laws, infiltrations, smear 
campaigns, harassment and intimidation. However, other problems came from within NGOs 
themselves. These include: lack of resources, absence of a culture of volunteerism, lack of clear 
visions, tribalism, regionalism and racism, having leaders who are power hungry and who often 
perform many roles. Problems stemming from within NGOs can be dealt with. The most 
powerful tool in that endeavor is their membership. Members should take control of their 
organizations and prevent them being transformed into personal entities by unscrupulous 
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individuals.  When organizations are weak institutionally, the end result is dismal failure. All the 
possible solutions presented in this chapter serve to strengthen Zimbabwean NGOs 





















CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The term ‘civil society’ was coined by Aristotle who saw civil society’s purpose as that of 
maintaining order and entrenching civility in his polis. At this stage civil society and the state 
were synonymous with each other. Since then the concept has metamorphosed in Western 
philosophy and politics to mean something separate from government and the market, a 
position existing today. In sub-Saharan Africa, a concept of civil society can be traced in the 
African notion of ubuntu in which individual interests are safeguarded within a group. Civil 
society in the West became prominent in the 1980s as a result of disillusionment with 
government and the market. It came as an alternative, a third way, to supplement the failures 
of the government and the market.  
 
Civil society manifests itself in many forms, this paper discussed three: civil society as the 
associational life, the good society and the public sphere (Edwards, 2009). The paper chose 
NGOs as a subset of civil society and looked at how they are able to make society strong. NGOs 
became the ‘favoured child’ of development in the 1990s with Western governments and 
donor agencies using them as agents of development in the third world. Korten (1990) 
identified three types of NGOs: generation one, two and three which take different approaches 
in trying to create the ‘good society.’ The study identified three approaches (schools) which 
enable NGOs to make society strong: the civic culture, comparative associational school and the 
school of skeptics (Edwards, 2009). The dissertation chose to draw on which it dwelt on the 
comparative associational school which enables NGOs to pressure governments to adopt, 
implement and monitor policies to meet the interests and demands of the majority. 
 
The study looked at the question of what role NGOs played in policy influence in Zimbabwe. 
The study noted that through the notion of ubuntu civil society had a considerable influence on 
the way of life in African societies. It shaped the way Africans contacted and governed 
themselves which was aimed at creating harmony. This way of life was dismantled by 
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colonialism which strived to make civil society irrelevant in shaping policies concerning black 
people. However, out of that oppression arose a form of civil society which was aimed at 
resisting subjugation and oppression and ultimately gave rise to resistance movements who 
fought for independence and freedom. After independence, in the case of Zimbabwe, NGOs 
were overwhelmed by the euphoria of attaining independence. The ZANU (PF) led government 
co-opted a majority of NGOs in the policy making process. NGOs did not complain as they 
viewed this as cooperation with government. However, the period of cooperation did not last 
long as the turn of the millennium ushered in a whole new relationship between NGOs and 
government. The period is characterized by mistrust and outright hostility. During the period on 
which this study focused, NGOs found it difficult to influence national public policy as any 
deviation from the government way of thinking was viewed as a way of trying to effect regime 




Land policy was chosen for the reason that Zimbabwe is an agro-based society, and therefore, 
land is important in trying to meet the interests and needs of the majority. Zimbabwe has had 
numerous land policies since 1890. Before independence, the land policy was meant to benefit 
one race at the expense of the others, therefore it was imperative for the country after 
independence to make sure that land was equitably distributed. After independence, the 
government embarked on land distribution based on a willing seller-willing buyer policy. The 
government argued that the willing seller-willing buyer policy was laden with hurdles making it 
impossible to achieve any meaningful success, resulting in it being abandoned. At the turn of 
the millennium, government adopted the FTLRP which has been dubbed chaotic and the cause 
of the hemorrhaging of the economy and the general socio-political ills besetting the country. 
Thus, NGOs were important players in guiding against unscrupulous government business and 




The study also tried to answer the question: How can NGOs influence policy in Zimbabwe? 
NGOs generally have three strategies to use in influencing public policies: (1) partnering with 
government in policy formulation, implementation and evaluation (2) fostering accountability, 
that is, holding government accountable and answerable for its actions during the whole policy 
cycle, and (3) policy advocacy, which is lobbying from outside for the adoption of policies 
favourable to the majority. The paper looked at two prominent NGOs which have been involved 
in the land issue, CFU and JAG. The study found that the two NGOs used all three strategies: 
partnering with government, demanding accountability and policy advocacy in trying to 
influence the land policy. However this had little success as the government perceived the two 
NGOs as working against it and as a result it created numerous problems and challenges for the 
NGOs. The majority of problems arose as a result of the political environment in which the 
NGOs are working. However, some arose from the way the NGOs conducted themselves. The 
study then looked at how these problems and challenges can be addressed. It has been noted 
in the dissertation that they can only be addressed by NGOs themselves, in most cases by 
creating the environment which is conducive for their work.  
 
The conclusion which can be drawn from this study is that sub-Saharan NGOs especially those 
in Zimbabwe are still relevant and important in developmental discourse. Scholars are right in 
pointing out that resources channeled towards these NGOs don’t tally the results on the 
ground. This has been the case with CFU and JAG which have failed thus far to influence the 
land policy in Zimbabwe for the past fifteen years despite the fact that the majority of citizens 
and leading scholars agree that the current policy is counterproductive. However, the study has 
noted that this mismatch is because of a plethora of problems which hamstring their operation. 
If these problems are dealt with, the work of NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa and Zimbabwe in 
particular especially in policy analysis will greatly improve, and make NGOs as important as 
government and business in development and poverty reduction. 
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